UIC Law Review
Volume 55

Issue 1

Article 6

2022

Supreme Court Forces Divorce for a Happily Married Couple: The
Trail and Its Land, 55 UIC L. Rev. 176 (2022)
Jesse Carbonaro

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jesse Carbonaro, Supreme Court Forces Divorce for a Happily Married Couple: The Trail and Its Land, 55
UIC L. Rev. 176 (2022)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol55/iss1/6
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For
more information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

SUPREME COURT FORCES DIVORCE FOR
A HAPPILY MARRIED COUPLE: THE TRAIL
AND ITS LAND
JESSE CARBONARO*
I.
II.

INTRODUCTION ................................................................ 177
BACKGROUND .................................................................. 179
A. History of the Appalachian National Scenic Trail’s
Ecological Resources................................................ 179
B. Atlantic Coast Pipeline Project Mired in Litigation
from its Inception .................................................... 180
C. Atlantic Coast Pipeline’s Invasive Construction
Through the Appalachian Trail .............................. 183
D. Forest Service and the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission Ruling to Approve the ACP After the
Forest Service’s Initial Denial ................................ 186
E. The Fourth Circuit Ruling to Vacate Atlantic’s Special
Use Permit Due to Several Environmental Violations
.................................................................................. 187
F. Supreme Court’s Ruling to Reverse and Remand the
Fourth Circuit .......................................................... 189
III. COURT’S ANALYSIS .......................................................... 189
A. The Court Created a Patchwork Analysis of Statutes
to Conclude There is No Legal Pairing Between the
Trail and Its Land ................................................... 190
1. The Court Used the Organic Act to Define Area of
Land to be Land Administered by the Secretary of
the Interior Acting Through the Director of the
National Park Service ....................................... 191
2. The Court Relied on Property Law Principles to
Distinguish the Trail from Its Land, An Argument
the Dissent Found Unconvincing ..................... 192
3. The Court Argued Under the Trails Act, the
National Park Service Has a Limited Role of
Administering the Trail as an Easement, but the
Land Remained Within the Forest Service ..... 194
4. The Court Reasoned that the Lands that the Trail
Crosses Remain Under the Forest Service’s
Jurisdiction and Continue to be “Federal Lands”
Under the Mineral Leasing Act........................ 196
B. The Dissent Read the Statutes Plainly to Conclude
There is a Legal Pairing Between the Trail and Its
Land ......................................................................... 197
1. The Dissent Branded the Court’s Use of Property
Law as Unconvincing ........................................ 197
2. The Dissent Used the Organic Act’s Definition of
“Area of Land” to be Units of the Park System
............................................................................ 198
3. The Dissent Argued So Long as the National Park
Service Administers the Trail, the Trail is Land
Within the National Park System.................... 199
4. The Dissent Argued the Appalachian Trail is
Land in the National Park System, and the MLA

2022]

Supreme Court Forces Divorce for a Happily Married Couple

177

does Not Permit Pipeline Right-of-Way Across
Those Lands ...................................................... 201
5. The Dissent Relied on Congressional Intent to
Argue the Trail is a Part of the Park System .. 202
C. The Dissent Argued Not Only Is There a Legal Pairing
Between the Trail and Its Land, but that There is also
a Practical One ........................................................ 204
IV. ANALYSIS ......................................................................... 206
A. The Dissent Correctly Read the Statutes Plainly to
Conclude There is a Legal Pairing Between the Trail
and Its Land............................................................. 206
1. The Majority’s Attempt to Dilute the Clear
Definitions Provided in the Organic Act and Trails
Act with a Complicated Discussion of Property
Law was Unsubstantiated ................................ 206
2. The Mineral Leasing Act Demonstrates that the
Park Service Administers the Appalachian Trail,
and the Trail is Within the National Park System
............................................................................ 208
B. The Dissent Correctly Read the Statutes Plainly to
Conclude There is a Practical Pairing Between the
Trail and Its Land ................................................... 209
1. The Forest Service’s Implementation of the Term
“Trail” Means the Trail and Its Land are an
Inseparable Pair ................................................ 209
2. The Oral Argument Explained Why There is a
Practical Pairing Between the Trail and Its Land
............................................................................ 210
C. Construction of the Trail Will Have Lasting Impacts
on the Trail, and Therefore Environmental Impacts
Should Have Had More Consideration................... 212
1. The Court Ignored Peer-Reviewed Science that
Construction has Lasting Implications on the
Land ................................................................... 212
2. While the Dissent Touched on the Implications of
Constructions, the Seriousness of Impacts
Warranted More Attention ............................... 214
V. CONCLUSION ................................................................... 215

I.

INTRODUCTION

While divorce feels increasingly common, there was one
“couple” that never wanted, nor expected, to separate—the
Appalachian National Scenic Trail [hereinafter “Appalachian Trail”
or “Trail”] and its land. On June 15, 2020, the Supreme Court forced
a separation, a divorce of sorts, between the Trail and the land that
forms it in U.S. Forest Service v. Cowpasture River Preservation
Association.1 Any hiker who walks the Trail understands the
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obvious connection between the Trail and the land, a relationship
that seems to have escaped some on the Court. Justice Kagan
explained in oral argument that “when you walk on the trail . . .
[you are] walking on land” and that “the trail is a piece of land.”2
Much like a marriage, a trail and “the land upon which it exists”3
are a union that, once made, is never meant to be separated.
The Supreme Court in Cowpasture made the critical mistake
of separating the Trail from its land4 and wrongly reversed and
remanded the Fourth Circuit’s holding.5 The Court incorrectly
severed the Trail from “the land upon which it exists,”6 through an
analysis which neglected to conclude that (1) the Trail and its land
are both legally paired through a plain reading of the statutes and
(2) the Trail and its land are practically paired, as the
environmental impacts equally implicate both the Trail and its
land.7
Part I will explore the factual and procedural history of
Cowpasture, including the Atlantic Coast Pipeline’s [hereinafter
“ACP”] construction and route through the Appalachian Trail. Part
II will study the Court’s reasoning behind separating the Trail from
its land and the dissent’s logic in concluding the opposite. Part III
will argue the Court ignored the rational conclusion that the Trail
is legally and practically indivisible from its land, and the dissent
correctly interpreted the intertwining statutes. The Court’s
majority opinion ignored the environmental impacts of a pipeline
through the National Park System and Congress’s goal of
conserving the Trail. The environmental impacts—only touched
upon in the dissent—warranted more attention, particularly given
their implications for the close relationship between the
Appalachian Trail and the land that was at issue in the case.
* Jesse Carbonaro, Juris Doctor Candidate 2022, UIC School of Law. Thank
you to my parents, Joe and Jane, and sister, Danielle who have supported and
loved me throughout my entire life. Additionally, thank you to Brian, who
encouraged me to apply my passion for the environment to the law.
1. U.S. Forest Serv. v. Cowpasture River Pres. Ass’n., 140 S. Ct. 1837, 1850
(2020).
2. Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. 1837 (2020)
(Nos. 18-1584, 18-1587), 2020 WL 883393 at *12.
3. Gillian Giannetti, SCOTUS Debrief: The Atlantic Coast Pipeline
Cowpasture Case, NRDC (Feb. 25, 2020), www.nrdc.org/experts/gilliangiannetti/oral-argument-debrief-cowpasture-case [perma.cc/8D4E-NES9].
4. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1844. The Court initiated the split between the
Trail and its land by “focus[ing] on the distinction between the lands that the
Trail traverses and the Trail itself.” Id. This divorced relationship incorrectly
placed “the lands (not the Trail) are the object of the relevant statutes.” Id.
5. Id. at 1850.
6. Giannetti, supra note 3.
7. See generally Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1841-50 (demonstrating that
Justice Thomas found there was no statutory authority to support the notion
that the Appalachian Trail was unified with the land and that environmental
considerations were not included as a significant factor in his analysis).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. History of the Appalachian National Scenic Trail’s
Ecological Resources
The National Trails System Act (“Trails Act”) established
national scenic and historic trails, including the Appalachian Trail.8
Visited by approximately two million hikers annually, the Trail is a
2,190 mile public trail traversing the spine of the Appalachian
Mountains.9 The Trail passes through significant and rare
ecosystems in fourteen states, six national parks, eight national
forests, and two national refuges.10 The Trail’s ecosystem serves “as
an indicator of the health of the natural resources of the entire
Eastern Seaboard”11 because it holds a substantial amount of fragile
and protected habitat, vegetation, and wildlife, called biodiversity
hotspots.12
The integrity and resources of the Appalachian Trail are
vulnerable to “incompatible developments,” like pipelines.13
Pipelines that penetrate the Trail, or its adjacent land, cause the
depletion and eradication of the Trail’s precious biological and
cultural resources.14 The ACP, undoubtedly one of these
incompatible developments, created concern over how this pipeline
would burden the Trail and its nearby land15 due to the

8. 16 U.S.C § 1244(a) (2022). The Appalachian Trail was the second trail
created under the Trails Act. § 1244(a)(1).
9. Appalachian National Scenic Trail, NAT’L PARKS CONSERVATION ASS’N, 1
(Mar. 2010), www.nps.gov/appa/learn/management/upload/AT-report-web.pdf
[perma.cc/F93K-2Y2H].
10. Id.
11. Id. at 7 (explaining that a 2010 Special Report of the National Parks
Conservation Association qualified the Trail as an indicator of health).
12. John Charles Kunich, The Uncertainty of Life and Death: The
Precautionary Principle, gödel, and the Hotspots Wager, 17 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L.
1, 13 (2008). Biodiversity Hotspots are “[c]omparatively limited geographical
areas with a disproportionately large number of endemic species.” Id.
Biodiversity refers to the variability among habitat, vegetation, and wildlife.
Bradley M. Bernau, Help for Hotspots: Ngo Participation in the Preservation of
Worldwide Biodiversity, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 617, 620 (2006) (citing
Convention on Biological Diversity art. 2, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 142, 146
(1992)).
13. Appalachian National Scenic Trail, supra note 9, at 2. (“The narrow,
linear nature of the trail corridor, coupled with its prime location along the crest
of the Appalachian Mountains, leaves it susceptible to an array of development
threats, such as pipeline”).
14. Id. at 19; 9-11.
15. Brief of Amicus Curiae the Appalachian Trail Conservancy in Support
of None of the Parties at 32, Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. 1837 (2020) (Nos. 18-1584,
18-1587).
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imperativeness of preserving the Trail in its entirety.16
Since the Appalachian Trail was minted as a National Trail,
Congress has never authorized a right-of-way for a pipeline which
would cross the Trail on federally owned land.17 Rather, the
pipelines that do infiltrate the Appalachian Trail, do so under the
authority of the Mineral Leasing Act (“MLA”).18 These rights-of-way
are permitted to cross the Trail because they either rely on an
easement created prior to federal ownership or cross on land to
which the MLA does not apply.19

B. Atlantic Coast Pipeline Project Mired in Litigation
from its Inception
In 2015, Atlantic was formed as a LLC to develop and own the

16. Id. It is critical to preserve the Trail “in its full richness, the experience
of nature and of the nation’s history and culture that hiking the Trail affords.”
Id.
17. Brief for Respondents at 8, Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. 1837 (2020) (Nos. 181584, 18-1587) (citing a 2013 decision by the Forest Service authorized a
pipeline to proceed alongside a preexisting pipeline right-of-way over the
Appalachian Trail on federal land.); see also Forest Serv., Decision Notice,
Columbia
Gas,
Giles
County,
Virginia
(Nov.
22,
2013),
www.fs.usda.gov/nfs/11558/www/nepa/93590_FSPLT3_1462661.pdf
[perma.cc/G52Z-GN2P] (verifying that the Trail was rerouted before new
pipeline construction began; no new crossing occurred on federal land).
18. WildEarth Guardians v. Jewell, 1:15-CV-2026-WJM, 2016 WL 8577508,
1 (D. Colo. June 17, 2016). The MLA “governs the leasing of public lands for
developing deposits of federally owned coal, petroleum, natural gas, and other
minerals.” Id. The MLA was intended “to promote the orderly development of
oil and gas deposits in publicly owned lands of the United States through
private enterprise.” Geosearch, Inc. v. Andrus, 508 F. Supp. 839, 842 (D. Wyo.
1981) (citing Harvey v. Udall, 384 F.2d 883, 885 (10th Cir. 1967)). The Act
mandates that before “any action on a leasehold which might cause a significant
disturbance of the environment, the lessee shall submit for the Secretary’s
approval an operation and reclamation plan.” 30 U.S.C. § 207(c) (2022). Then,
the Secretary must “approve or disapprove the plan or require that it be
modified.” Id.
19. The MLA is applicable to federal land, not state or private land. 30
U.S.C. § 185 (2022). “Respondents acknowledge that if the pipeline had passed
through an area that was not public land, their argument(s) would not apply.”
Lindsay Williams, Unhappy Trails: Leasing Authority and the Trails Act, U.S.
Forest Service v. Cowpasture River Preservation Association (2020), 45 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 521, 537, n. 35 (2021) (citing Brief for Respondents, supra note
17 at 8). Pipeline developers contend a ruling that the Forest Service does not
have authority under the MLA to grant rights-of-way through lands within
national forests would act as a 2,000-mile barrier to development. Ellen Gilmer,
Dominion Pipeline Clashes With Appalachian Trail at High Court, BLOOMBERG
LAW (Feb. 10, 2020), www.news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-andenergy/natural-gas-pipeline-iconic-trail-at-odds-in-supreme-court-case
[perma.cc/J62A-SPL9].
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Atlantic Coast Pipeline.20 Atlantic filed an application with the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the agency tasked with
the regulation of interstate transmission of natural gas,21 to
construct and operate the ACP.22 The ACP was a proposed “604.5
mile, 42-inch diameter natural gas pipeline, that would stretch from
West Virginia to North Carolina.”23 Atlantic asserted that the
purpose of the ACP was to provide an energy supply to communities
across North Carolina and Virginia.24 The Fourth Circuit did not
find this to be a sufficient reason to justify the construction of the
pipeline.25
The ACP has been mired in litigation since the beginning.26
20. Joint Appendix at 32, Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. 1837 (2020) (Nos. 18-1584,
18-1587). Dominion Energy and Duke Energy are Atlantic’s majority ownership
holders. Id. Dominion and Duke have a combined annual eighty billion dollars
in sales and primarily engage in the distribution of natural gas. Dominion
Energy
(D),
FORBES,
www.forbes.com/companies/dominionenergy/#1acf1b823392 [perma.cc/UNZ4-3QYG] (last visited Jan. 10, 2022);
Duke
Energy
(Duk),
FORBES,
www.forbes.com/companies/dukeenergy/#7623ae946f9b [perma.cc/E5GP-9EC9] (last visited Jan. 10, 2022).
21.
What
FERC
Does,
FED.
ENERGY
REG.
COMM’N,
www.ferc.gov/about/what-ferc/what-ferc-does [perma.cc/4TAM-84JN] (last
visited Oct. 6, 2020); Natural Gas Pipelines: 2019 In Review, Practical Law
Article w-023-4881.
22. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1841.
23. Cowpasture River Pres. Ass’n v. Forest Serv., 911 F.3d 150, 155 (4th Cir.
2018), cert. granted, No.18-1584, WL 4889926 (Oct. 4, 2019), cert. granted, Atl.
Coast Pipeline, L.L.C. v. Cowpasture River Pres. Ass'n, No.18-1587, WL 4889930
(Oct. 4, 2019).
24. Dominion Energy and Duke Energy cancel the Atlantic Coast Pipeline,
DUKE ENERGY (July 5, 2020), www.news.dominionenergy.com/2020-07-05Dominion-Energy-and-Duke-Energy-Cancel-the-Atlantic-Coast-Pipeline
[perma.cc/7GBW-C8KN] [hereinafter DUKE ENERGY].
25. Joint Appendix, supra note 20, at 37. The Fourth Circuit was “not
persuaded by [the] contention that there is insufficient supply in the
Appalachian Basin to support the pipeline.” Id. Dick Brooks of the Cowpasture
River Preservation shared this sentiment, stating “[i]t’s been six years since this
pipeline was proposed, we didn’t need it then and we certainly don’t need it
now.” Becky Sullivan & Laurel Wamsley, Supreme Court Says Pipeline May
Cross
Underneath
Appalachian
Trail,
NPR
(Jun.
15,
2020),
www.npr.org/2020/06/15/877643195/supreme-court-says-pipeline-may-crossunderneath-appalachian-trail
[perma.cc/9SEB-CVR7].
President
Biden
demonstrated the importance of being cautious in analyzing the need for a
pipeline before construction when he revoked a permit for the Keystone XL
Pipeline. Exec. Order No. 13990, 86 Fed. Reg. 7037 (Jan. 20, 2021). The
President reasoned that a natural gas pipeline would not serve the best
interests of the United States given the severity of climate change, and it was
in the country’s best interest to “prioritize the development of a clean energy
economy, which will in turn create good jobs.” Id.
26. Noah Sachs, Argument analysis: The trail, the pipeline and a journey to
the
center
of
the
earth,
SCOTUSBLOG
(Feb.
25,
2020),
www.scotusblog.com/2020/02/argument-analysis-cowpasture/
[perma.cc/MK6N-BS5H] [hereinafter Sachs I]. The ACP has faced significant
litigation outside of the Cowpasture case. Id. While the ACP is now canceled, at
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Several courts, mostly the Fourth Circuit,27 have issued rulings that
have impeded the construction of the ACP.28 The litigation at the
center of this Note began after two years of conflict over Atlantic’s
applications for a Special Use Permit29 to construct and operate the
ACP across the Appalachian Trail. The Forest Service issued the
permit and granted a right-of-way in 2017.30 Subsequently, the
Fourth Circuit vacated the Special Use Permit, reasoning that the
Forest Service lacked the authority pursuant to the MLA to grant a
pipeline right-of-way across the Trail.31
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on October 4, 2019 and
held the Forest Service had statutory authority to grant a right-ofway under the Appalachian Trail.32 While Atlantic won the battle
the time of the Cowpasture case, a ruling would “neither stop nor guarantee the
development of the 600-mile pipeline” because there were several key permits
that had sent back to the agencies by the courts. Amelia Burnette, Court Weighs
in on Pipeline Crossing Appalachian Trail, REGULATORY REVIEW (Aug. 3, 2020),
www.theregreview.org/2020/08/03/burnette-court-weighs-pipeline-crossingappalachian-trail/ [perma.cc/V5FU-KUV7]. The aforementioned challenges to
ACP permits include:
Endangered Species Act permit (Biological Opinion) from the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service, Special Use Permit and right-of-way grant from the
U.S. Forest Service, Right-of-way permit from the National Park Service,
Virginia air pollution permit for the Union Hill compressor station, [and]
Four Clean Water Act authorizations from the Corps of Engineers for
Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Virginia, and North Carolina.
Atlantic Coast Pipeline problems persist despite Supreme Court decision, S.
ENV’T L. CTR. (Jun. 15, 2020), www.southernenvironment.org/news-andpress/press-releases/atlantic-coast-pipeline-problems-persist-despite-supremecourt-decision [perma.cc/3PNR-K7FT].
27. Sachs I, supra note 26 (The Fourth Circuit has been most involved as
they have vacated seven other ACP permits).
28. DUKE ENERGY, supra note 24. The United States District Court for the
District of Montana has vacated “long-standing federal permit authority for
waterbody and wetland crossings.” Id. On December 17, 2021, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit decided on a challenge to the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s decision to provide a “more limited
disclosure—the property owners’ initials and street names” along the now
discontinued ACP. Niskanen Ctr. v. FERC, No. 20-5028, 2021 WL 5979261, at
*1 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 17, 2021).
29.
Special-use
Permit
Application,
U.S.
FOREST
SERV.
www.fs.usda.gov/working-with-us/contracts-commercial-permits/special-usepermit-application [perma.cc/9QLN-HRQE] (last visited Nov. 17, 2020). A
special-use permit “allows occupancy, use, rights, or privileges of agency land.
Id. The authorization is granted for a specific use of the land for a specific period
of time.” Id.
30. Cowpasture, 911 F.3d at 155-60.
31. Id. at 155.
32. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1841. The Supreme Court granted certiorari
in the consolidated cases Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC v. Cowpasture River
Preservation Association and United States Forest Service v. Cowpasture River
Preservation Association. Id. It was an unusual case for the Court to consider
because “[t]here was no circuit split—only one circuit court had ruled on this
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in Cowpasture, they ultimately lost the war to build the ACP.33
After six years and billions of dollars invested, on July 5, 2020,
Atlantic announced the cancellation of the ACP construction.34
Atlantic blamed the termination on construction delays and legal
developments, which created uncertainties on the cost to complete
the project.35 Nonetheless, the implications of the Supreme Court’s
ruling will reverberate throughout National Park Service lands.36

C. Atlantic Coast Pipeline’s Invasive Construction
Through the Appalachian Trail
The ACP would have required extensive construction to cross
under the Appalachian Trail, causing devastating impacts on the
environment.37 Atlantic planned to “blast and flatten Forest
mountain ridgelines” and dig an eight-foot trench to lay its pipe.38
Atlantic intended to clear a 125-foot-wide stretch of trees and other
vegetation and diminish the land to only seventy-five feet in
wetlands.39 Deforestation of this magnitude would negatively alter
the well-known and well-loved visual experience of hiking the Trail
and degrade the ecosystem of the surrounding area.40 Construction
would have converted the previously forested ecosystem to a
issue—and there was no constitutional question.” Burnette, supra note 26.
33. Message to Our Communities, ATLANTIC COAST PIPELINE,
www.atlanticcoastpipeline.com/default.aspx
[perma.cc/56CF-CHDQ]
(last
visited Oct. 7, 2020).
34. Id.
35. DUKE ENERGY, supra note 24.
36. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 2, at 19. The consequences of a
ruling that the Trail is not lands in the National Park System would mean
“thousands and thousands of acres of park land gets transferred to the Forest
Service and these thousand-mile trails get converted into barriers to pipeline
development.” Id. Environmental groups and the impacted communities, which
would have been negatively impacted if the construction of the pipeline came to
fruition, shared this “concern about the ruling's implication for the integrity of
the National Forest System,” and the vulnerability for the “already-complex
regulatory scheme governing National Forests” to be dismembered. Lawson
Fite, Cowpasture Decision Upholds Integrity of the National Forest System, 52
NO. 1 ABA TRENDS 4, 6 (Sept./Oct. 2020) [hereinafter Fite I]. Environmental
groups and the impacted communities include the “Cowpasture River
Preservation Association, Highlanders for Responsible Development,
Shenandoah Valley Battlefields Foundation, Shenandoah Valley Network,
Sierra Club, Virginia Wilderness Committee, and Wild Virginia”. Cowpasture,
140 S. Ct. at 1842.
37. Brief for Respondents, supra note 17, at 9.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Joint Appendix, supra note 20, at 107. Permanent visual impacts would
where permanent structures of the ACP like “compressor stations, houses,
buildings, guardrails” would exist. Id. These structures are “inconsistent with
the existing visual character of the area” and would impact views on the Trail.
Id.
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drastically different plant schema that is entirely inconsistent with
the area’s natural ecosystem.41 The ACP would have demanded a
fifty-foot right of way42 that would run for most of the Trail’s length
through the George Washington National Forest for the lifetime of
the pipeline, prompting frequent disruptive maintenance
procedures.43
Atlantic would construct the ACP using the Horizontal
Directional Drilling method (“HDD”),44 which would drill a onemile-long and three-and-a-half feet wide borehole where the
pipeline crosses the Trail.45 Atlantic acknowledged the inherent
risk for the failure of HDD to leak hazardous substances.46 This
method requires invasive heavy machinery for the entirety of the
construction process.47 The HDD method would persist for over a
year, generating twenty-four-hour noise in sensitive areas.48 Its
incessant use of construction night lights would diminish visibility
to engage in astronomical viewing and research.49 There would be
extreme soil disruption and loss around the ecosystem.50
41. See id. at 107 (explaining that the ecosystem would be converted “to
scrub-shrub or herbaceous vegetation types”).
42. Cowpasture, 911 F.3d at 155.
43. Id.
44. Drilling—Horizontal directional drilling, ENV. SCI. DESKBOOK § 5:48
(2020). HDD is a method used for installing “environmental remediation wells”
in Pipeline projects. Id. If HDD turned out to be incompatible with the project,
Atlantic’s contingency plan was the direct pipe crossing option, which is an even
more invasive process. Brief for Respondents, supra note 17, at 72. “This
alternative “would result in an additional 3,996 feet . . . of cleared pipeline rightof-way” and would “result in an additional [two] acres of forest impact.” Id.
“Implementing this contingency option would increase the duration of project
activities and the resulting air, noise, and traffic impacts from these activities
near the [AT.]” Id. The success of HDD “is not at all certain,” and “Atlantic's
contingency plan . . . ‘is expected to intensify the disruptive effects of the
pipeline.’” Id. at 10 (citing Sierra Club v. United States Dep’t of Interior, 899
F.3d 260, 294 (4th Cir. 2018)).
45. Brief for Respondents, supra note 17, at 10; Gilmer, supra note 19 (this
method would “drill sideways through the mountain’s bedrock and basalt”).
46. Joint Appendix, supra note 20, at 69 (“[T]here is some inherent risk with
the HDD method and unknown factors can cause a HDD to fail, and alluvium
at the entry and exit locations could complicate the drilling process.”).
47. Brief for Respondents, supra note 17, at 10 (machinery required included
“drilling rigs, mud pumps, cranes, backhoes, and engine-driven light plants”).
48. See Joint Appendix, supra note 20, at 79 (explaining that construction
would have created a significant “increase above the ambient sound level at two
noise sensitive areas (“NSAs”) located 600 feet and 1,300 feet from the HDD
entry site would be about 0.1 to 0.2 decibels.”).
49. Id. at 80.
50. A State Supreme Court held that a construction project’s erosion would
negatively result in “a reduction in the capacity of the land to hold water.” In re
Wildlife Wonderland, Inc., 346 A.2d 645, 653 (Vt. 1975). Erosion makes the
surrounding environment more prone to flooding. Soil Erosion and
Degradation,
WWF,
www.worldwildlife.org/threats/soil-erosion-anddegradation [perma.cc/SY8E-9UDF] (last visited Jan. 13, 2022). In this case,
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Broad deforestation and interference with the land would
impact the historically significant visual experience hiking on the
Appalachian Trail provides by introducing foreign permanent
structures to the landscape and degrading the health and beauty of
the Trail’s nature.51 Any hiker would agree that the value of a trail
extends beyond the trail to the land that encompasses it, and that
the infrastructure of a pipeline is unnatural to the Trail’s inherent
environment.
Construction would significantly degrade the ecological value
of the Trail. The ACP’s proposed route would have traversed
twenty-one miles of national forest land, including sixteen miles of
land within the George Washington National Forest and five miles
through the Monongahela National Forest.52 The ACP’s route
raised ecological concerns as the path would transect fifty-seven
rivers, streams, and lakes, and numerous other ecologically vital
areas.53 By infiltrating these lands, the ACP route would displace
critical wildlife habitat, which could take over fifty years to
recover.54 This habitat is home to some of the world’s richest
populations of temperate zone species55 such as bears, foxes,
woodpeckers, owls, salamanders, and butterflies.56 This habitat
also includes threatened and endangered species, such as the Little
Brown Bat, which are critical for pest control, pollination, and seed
spreading.57 The pipeline would ultimately “increase soil erosion
and sedimentation, risk landslides and contamination of
groundwater and soil, and displace wildlife habitat, some which
could take ‘50 years or longer’ to recover.”58 Construction on the
“[s]edimentation modeling indicates annual soil loss will be 200 to 800 percent
above baseline erosion during the first year of construction,” and if restoration
takes place, it will take years to return to pre-construction soil levels.
Cowpasture, 911 F.3d at 166 (citing Corrected Deferred Joint Appendix, at 25).
51. Joint Appendix, supra note 20, at 102 (“[A] construction zone would
introduce contrasts of color, texture, line, and pattern, and possibly of form
where the pipeline would crest ridges and knobs.”).
52. Cowpasture, 911 F.3d at 155.
53. Brief for Respondents, supra note 17, at 9-10 (citing Fourth Circuit
Appendix, 1659).
54. Brief for Respondents, supra note 17, at 11 (citing Fourth Circuit
Appendix, 1468-70, 1604, 1611, 1630, 1682-83).
55. The Appalachian Trail in five minutes, ESA (Mar. 9, 2011),
www.esa.org/esablog/research/the-appalachian-trail-in-five-minutes/
[perma.cc/ZP4X-W8CS].
56. Emma Rosenfield, Wildlife along the Appalachian Trail, TREK (Apr. 10,
2019),
www.thetrek.co/appalachian-trail/wildlife-along-appalachian-trail/
[perma.cc/L39B-QM2F].
57. Cowpasture, 911 F.3d at 155; 158; Matt Trott, Beneficial Bats: Little
Brown Bat Keeps Us Safe, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVS. (Oct. 26, 2015),
www.fws.gov/news/blog/index.cfm/2015/10/26/beneficial-bats-little-brown-batkeeps-us-safe [perma.cc/Q83M-X4SC].
58. Brief for Respondents, supra note 17, at 11 (citing Fourth Circuit
Appendix, 1468-70, 1604, 1611, 1630, 1682-83); Mike Tony, Atlantic Coast
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Appalachian Trail would be immense and cascade far beyond the
physical trail.

D. Forest Service and the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission Ruling to Approve the ACP After the
Forest Service’s Initial Denial
In April 2016, the Forest Service initially denied Atlantic’s
plan and proposal for the Atlantic Coast Pipeline because of serious
environmental concerns, including the aforementioned detrimental
impacts of construction.59 However, in May 2017, the Forest Service
curiously withdrew these concerns and approved the pipeline and
right-of-way.60 The Forest Service determined the alternative
routes presented did not propose “a significant environmental
advantage when compared to the proposed route and would not be
economically practical.”61 Buried in the Forest Service’s ruling was
the project’s exemption from thirteen Forest Service planning
standards concerning “soil, water, riparian, threatened and
endangered species, and recreational and visual resources.”62 The
Fourth Circuit noted that “[d]espite the Forest Service’s clearly
stated concerns regarding the adverse impacts of the ACP project,
as Atlantic’s deadlines for the agency’s decisions drew closer, its
Pipeline restoration planned to start later in WV than other states, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE-MAIL
(Jan.
6,
2021),
www.wvgazettemail.com/news/energy_and_environment/atlantic-coastpipeline-restoration-planned-to-start-later-in-wv-than-otherstates/article_232fde2b-0f9e-57f9-9919-b4453d8dce58.html [perma.cc/3DWQAMNR]. West Virginia has implemented a restoration plan to address the
issues construction has already inflicted on the West Virginia; including an
increased risk for landslides. Id. For example, “[it’s] not just a runoff effect but
a whole side of a mountain running down into a stream. Stabilization and
revegetation, it’s really important that it’s done and done quickly.” Id. The plan
will also require cut-and-fill grading and temporary sediment barriers. Id.
59. See Cowpasture, 911 F.3d at 174 (stating
Specifically, the record reflects that the Forest Service voiced concerns
about (1) authorizing the SUP without ten site-specific stabilization
designs to demonstrate the effectiveness of Atlantic’s [Best in Class]
program; (2) the overly high efficiency rate of erosion control devices
used in the sedimentation analysis (96 percent); (3) relying on the use of
water bars as a mitigation technique, when Atlantic had not analyzed
whether water bars would mitigate or exacerbate erosion effects during
construction; and (4) Atlantic’s use of averaged versus episodic sediment
calculations to analyze the water resource impacts from increases in
sedimentation due to the ACP project.).
60. Andrew Graham, West Virginia, 5 OIL & GAS, NAT. RES. & ENERGY J.
319, 327 (2019) (quoting Cowpasture, 911 F.3d 158).
61. Cowpasture, 911 F.3d at 159 (citing U.S. Forest Service draft Record of
Decision).
62. Graham, supra note 60, at 327 (citing Cowpasture, 911 F.3d 162).
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tenor began to change.”63 This “mysterious”64 shift in level of
concern was made without acknowledging or explaining the Forest
Service’s change in position.65 In October 2017, the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission approved Atlantic’s application to
construct the ACP66 “with marginal analysis of actual need for the
natural gas.”67

E. The Fourth Circuit Ruling to Vacate Atlantic’s
Special Use Permit Due to Several Environmental
Violations
In January 2018, environmental organizations, concerned
about the Forest Service’s stark change in position over whether to
issue the Special Use Permit, brought an action in the Fourth
Circuit to review the agency’s decision to issue a Permit for the
construction of the ACP.68 A unanimous panel of the Fourth Circuit
vacated the Forest Service’s decision and remanded on four
independent bases.69 The Fourth Circuit held (1) the Forest Service
acted “arbitrarily and capriciously”70 in its issuance of the Special
63. Cowpasture, 911 F.3d at 158.
64. Id. at 183 (“A thorough review of the record leads to the necessary
conclusion that the Forest Service abdicated its responsibility to preserve
national forest resources. This conclusion is particularly informed by the Forest,
assuaged in time to meet a private pipeline company’s deadlines.”).
65. Id. at 175.
66. Atl. Coast Pipeline, LLC Dominion Transmission, Inc. Piedmont Nat.
Gas Co., Inc., 161 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61042, 2017 WL 4925429, at *3 (2017).
67. Sam Kalen, A Bridge to Nowhere? Our Energy Transition and the
Natural Gas Pipeline Wars, 9 MICH. J. ENV’T. & ADMIN. L. 319, 366 (2020)
(citing USDA Forest Service, Record of Decision on the Atlantic Coast Pipeline
Project Special Use Permit/Land and Resource Management Plan
Amendments, 23 (2017)). The agency took into consideration President Trump’s
energy infrastructure executive orders and the pressure for timely approvals in
their review process. Id.
68. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1842. “Respondents, including the Cowpasture
River Preservation Association and environmental organizations, brought an
action under the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. They alleged “the issuance
of the special use permit for the right-of-way under the Trail, as well as
numerous other aspects of the Forest Service’s regulatory process,” violated
MLA, National Environmental Policy Act, the National Forest Management Act
of 1976, and the Administrative Procedure Act. Id.
69. Brief for Respondents, supra note 17, at 11.
70. Cowpasture, 911 F.3d 160 (citing Sierra Club, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv.,
897 F.3d 582, 590 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting Defs. Of Wildlife v. N.C. Dep’t of
Transp., 762 F.3d 374, 396 (4th Cir. 2014))) (explaining that
An agency’s decision is arbitrary and capricious if: the agency relied on
factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to
consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for
its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so
implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the
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Use Permit;71 (2) violated National Environmental Policy Act by
failing to consider other feasible route alternatives;72 and (3)
provided an inadequate Final Environmental Impact Statement.73
The fourth holding, which was the issue appealed to the
Supreme Court, held that ‘“the Forest Service does not have
statutory authority to grant pipeline rights of way across the
[Appalachian Trail] pursuant [to] the [MLA].”’74 The Fourth Circuit
held the Appalachian Trail became part of the National Park
System because the Secretary of the Interior delegated its duty to
administer the Appalachian Trail to the National Park Service.75 In
other words, when the Trail became part of the National Park
System, the Trail became “married” to its land.
Consequently, the Fourth Circuit vacated the Forest Service's
Special Use Permit.76 The termination of the Permit hinged on the
MLA lacking the authority to vest the Forest Service’s ability “to
grant the pipeline right-of-way beneath the Trail.”77 Because the
Trail is a “unit”—a fact to which both parties agreed—the Trail is a
unit of the National Park System, “and thus is outside the scope of
the [MLA].”78 The practical effect of the vacated permit was a halt
product of agency expertise.).
71. Cowpasture, 911 F.3d at 160-67. The Forest Service acted arbitrarily and
capriciously because Atlantic’s proposal violated the National Forest
Management Act by not complying with required environmental standards. Id.
72. Id. at 168. The Fourth Circuit held that “Forest Service violated its
obligations under the [National Forest Management Act] and its own Forest
Plans because it failed to demonstrate that the ACP project’s needs could not be
reasonably met on non-national forest lands.” Id.
73. Cowpasture, 911 F.3d at 155. “Environmental impact statement (“EIS”)
describ[es] the likely environmental effects, ‘adverse environmental effects
which cannot be avoided,’ and potential alternatives to the proposal.” Id. (citing
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2022)). “The Fourth Circuit found FERC's EIS failed to
meet the Forest Service's needs.” Christine Tezak, A Policy Analyst’s View on
Litigation Risk Facing Natural Gas Pipelines, 40 ENERGY L.J. 209, 237 (2019)
(citing Cowpasture, 911 F.3d at 173). The Fourth Circuit held the Forest Service
violated NEPA by failing to take a hard look at the environmental
consequences of the ACP project.” Cowpasture, 911 F.3d at 173–74 (emphasis
added). The Forest Service was apprehensive that the draft EIC “lacked
necessary information to evaluate landslide risks, erosion impacts, and
degradation of water quality, and it further lacked information about the
effectiveness of mitigation techniques to reduce those risks.” Id. at 174.
Furthermore, Fourth Circuit noted the Forest Service violated the National
Forest Management Act when they “raised concerns that were never addressed
in the final [Environmental Impact Statement] or its own [decision], and
ultimately “relied on the very mitigation measures it previously found
unreliable.” Tezak, supra note 73, at 237 (citing Cowpasture, 911 F.3d at 174).
74. Brief for Respondents, supra note 17, at 13-14.
75. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1842 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1244(a)(1) (2022); 34
Fed. Reg. 14337 (1969); 54 U.S.C. § 100501 (2022)).
76. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1842 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2022)).
77. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1842.
78. Brief for Respondents, supra note 17, at 13.
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to pipeline construction. As such, “the Forest Service and Atlantic
both petitioned for certiorari, which the Court granted in October
2019.”79

F. Supreme Court’s Ruling to Reverse and Remand the
Fourth Circuit
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide if the Forest
Service has authority under the MLA “to grant rights-of-way
through lands within national forests traversed by the Appalachian
Trail.”80 In June 2020, the Court reversed and remanded the Fourth
Circuit decision in a 7-2 opinion by Justice Thomas.81 Justice
Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, to which Justice Kagan
joined.82 The majority held that the “Department of the Interior’s
decision to assign responsibility over the Appalachian National
Scenic Trail to the National Park Service did not transform the land
over which the Trail passes into land within the National Park
System.”83 Consequently, the Forest Service retained the authority
under the MLA “to grant rights-of-way within national forests
traversed by the Appalachian Trail.”84

III. COURT’S ANALYSIS
Section III, Part A of the Cowpasture analysis will explore the
discourse between how the issue was framed by the majority and
dissent, and their subsequent conclusions. Section III, Part B will
discuss the majority opinion’s patchwork analysis of the statutes
and their conclusion that there is no legal pairing between the
Appalachian Trail and its land.85 Each subsection will explore the
Court’s interpretation of the Organic Act, canons of property law,
the Trails Act, and the MLA. Section III, Part C will study the
dissent’s plain reading of the statutes, which led to the conclusion
that there is a legal pairing between the Trail and its land.86 Each
subsection will analyze at the dissent’s interpretation of property
law, the Organic Act, the Trails Act, the MLA and congressional

79. Fite I, supra note 36, at 6.
80. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1841.
81. Id. (Justice Ginsburg joined the majority opinion as to all but Part IIIB-2).
82. Id. at 1850.
83. 53 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 7 (originally published in 2020).
84. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1841.
85. See generally id. at 1841-50 (showing that the majority used language
from several statutes in order to conclude the MLA applied to the Trail separate
from its land, thereby separating the two entities).
86. See generally id. at 1850-61 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (demonstrating
that the dissent focused on statutory definition).
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intent. Section III, Part D will investigate the dissent’s conclusion
that there is a practical pairing between the Trail and its land based
on the environmental consequences on the pairing.87

A. The Court Created a Patchwork Analysis of Statutes
to Conclude There is No Legal Pairing Between the
Trail and Its Land
The Justices’ fundamental disagreement over what the issue
was surrounding the right-of-way under the Appalachian Trail
established two stark approaches to the statutory interpretation.88
Justice Thomas’s majority opinion framed the issue as to whether
the MLA vests the Forest Service the authority to grant a right-ofway through lands in a national forest crossed by the Appalachian
Trail.89 He constructed a blunt distinction “between the lands that
the Trail traverses and the Trail itself.”90 Under this assumption,
the Court established that the land was the object of the
interlocking federal statutes, not the Trail,91 and analyzed the
conglomerate of statutes to divorce the Appalachian Trail from its
land.92
The Court patched together the Organic Act, National Trails
Act, and MLA to reach their conclusion. Despite joining the
majority, Justice Breyer, at oral argument, likened the three
statutes to “ping pong . . . they have this, you have that.”93 Despite
acknowledging that in order to reach their decision the statutes
would have to “fit together” in a patchwork analysis, Justice
Thomas’s opinion for the majority proceeded to include more
statutes, the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (“Rivers Act”) and the Blue
Ridge Parkway, to support the Court’s analysis.94
In contrast, Justice Sotomayor, writing in dissent, asked
whether the Appalachian Trail is considered land within the
National Park System.95 She concluded the Trail cannot be
separated from the underlying land96 and branded the majority’s
analysis as “inconsistent with the language of three statutes,
87. See generally id. (corroborating that the dissent included the
environmental consequences of construction in their analysis).
88. See generally id. at 1841-61 (illuminating that the majority and dissent
did not come to a conscious on what the subject of the statutory analysis was).
89. Id. at 1844.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1843-44.
92. Id. at 1841.
93. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 2, at 43-4.
94. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1847 (Justice Thomas include the Rivers Act
and the Blue Ridge Parkway to exemplify that Congress did not use comparable
language in the Trails Act.).
95. Id. at 1851 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 1848.
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longstanding agency practice, and common sense.”97 Justice
Sotomayor positioned the Trail, not the land, as the object of the
intertwining statutes.98 She reasoned the National Park Service
administers the Trail99 and any area administered “by the Park
Service is a unit of and thus land in the National Park System.”100
The MLA “does not permit natural-gas pipelines across such
federally owned lands,”101 and only Congress can change that
mandate.102 The majority incorrectly detached the Trail from its
land through an analysis that mischaracterized the issue at
hand.103
1. The Court Used the Organic Act to Define Area of Land
to be Land Administered by the Secretary of the Interior
Acting Through the Director of the National Park Service
The Court and dissenters had an initial consensus as to the
utility of the Organic Act:104 the Act established the National Park
System and minted conservation as its sole mission.105 The
97. Id. at 1861 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 1851 (Justice Sotomayor positioned the issue as “whether parts of
the Appalachian Trail are ‘lands’ within the meaning of those statutes,”
referring to the interlocking statutes).
99. See id. at 1861 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing §§ 3(b), 5(a)(1), 82 Stat.
919–920; 34 Fed. Reg. 14337) (explaining that “[t]he Park Service administers
acres of land constituting the Appalachian Trail for scenic, historic, cultural,
and recreational purposes”).
100. See Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1861 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing
54 U.S.C. §§ 100102(6), 100501 (2022)) (relying on the logic that “any area of
land” that is “administered” by the Park Service is a part of the National Park
System as its “unit”).
101. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1861 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing 30
U.S.C. § 185(b) (2022)).
102. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1861 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); 54 U.S.C. §
100101(b)(2) (2022); see Brief for Respondents, supra note 17, at 6 (stating the
Park Service’s authorities “shall be construed . . . in light of” and not “exercised
in derogation of the values and purposes for which the System units have been
established, except as directly and specifically provided by Congress”).
103. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1848.
104. See id. at 1843, 1851 (citing 54 U.S.C. § 100501 (2022)) (indicating that
Justice Thomas and Sotomayor relied on the Organic Act to reach consensus of
its utility).
105. 54 U.S.C. § 100101 (2022). The National Park System’s mission is
conservation. Id. “Congress created national parks in order to ‘conserve the
scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to
provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as
will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.’” United
States v. Stephenson, 29 F.3d 162, 165 (4th Cir. 1994) (construing predecessor
to 54 U.S.C. § 100101 (2022)). The distinction between a National Forests and
National Parks is significant because “unlike national forests, Congress did not
regard the National Park System to be compatible with consumptive uses.”
Sierra Club, 899 F.3d at 292 (citing Mich. United Conservation Clubs v. Lujan,
949 F.2d 202, 207 (6th Cir. 1991).
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differences begin with how the Justices defined and used the
definition of “area of land” under the Organic Act. The Organic Act
states that the National Park System includes “any area of land . .
. administered by the [Park Service] for park, monument, historic,
parkway, recreational, or other purposes.”106
The majority stretched the Organic Act’s definition of “area of
land” to inform the definition “lands” in the Trails Act.107 The
majority argued the Department of the Interior has jurisdiction
over the lands at issue they delegated the administration of the
lands to the National Park Service.108 The Court urged that the
delegation of administration duties to the National Park Service did
not convert the Trail into “lands in the National Park System”109
and reinforced a marital dissolution “between the lands that the
Trail traverses and the Trail itself.”110
2. The Court Relied on Property Law Principles to
Distinguish the Trail from Its Land, An Argument the
Dissent Found Unconvincing
In order to conclude “[a] trail is a trail, and land is land,”111
Justice Thomas read the complicated assortment of statutes in light
of property law principles.112 The majority established a right-of106. 54 U.S.C. § 100501 (2022). Congress carefully chose the definition of
“area of land” in an effort to replace a history of “complex patchwork of
responsibility for various lands.” Brief for Respondents, supra note 17, at 5-6
(citing H.R. Rep. No. 91-1265, at 3 (1970)). “Congress created ‘one National Park
System’ that unambiguously includes every area the Park Service administers.”
Brief for Respondents, supra note 17, at 6 (citing 54 U.S.C. § 100101(b)(1)(B);
(D) (2022)) (“stating legislative “purpose . . . to include all these areas in the
System and to clarify the authorities applicable to the System.”)
107. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1841-43.
108. Id. at 1848 (citing 54 U.S.C. § 100501 (2022)).
109. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1848 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 185(b)(1) (2022)).
110. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1844.
111. Id. at 1846.
112. Noah Sachs, Opinion analysis: Appalachian Trail no barrier for major
gas
pipeline,
SCOTUSBLOG
(Jun.
17,
2020),
www.scotusblog.com/2020/06/opinion-analysis-appalachian-trail-no-barrierfor-major-gas-pipeline/ [perma.cc/98MM-GTYS] Justice Thomas’s opinion has
been described as “a treatise on the law of easements” that is “[l]oaded with
citations to state law and scholarly authorities.” Id. Justice Thomas explains
“[a] right-of-way is a type of easement” which grants the limited right to use
another’s land by passing through it. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1844 (citing
Kelly v. Rainelle Coal Co., 64 S.E.2d 606, 613 (1951); Builders Supplies Co. of
Goldsboro, N. C., Inc. v. Gainey, 282 N.C. 261, 266 (1972); R. Powell & P. Rohan,
Real Property § 405 (1968); Restatement (First) of Property § 450 (1944);
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1489 (4th ed. 1968)). “And because an easement does
not dispossess the original owner, [] ‘a possessor and an easement holder can
simultaneously utilize the same parcel of land.’” Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1844
(citing Barnard v. Gaumer, 361 P.2d 778, 780 (Colo 1961)) (quoting J. Bruce &
J. Ely, Law of Easements and Licenses in Land § 1:1, p. 1–5 (2015)). Therefore,
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way is a type of easement that creates a path that can be used by a
nonowner.113 The majority imported property law114 to conclude
easements are distinct from the land they burden because
easements solely burden land owned by another.115 The Court
reasoned the right-of-way under the Appalachian Trail only granted
non-possessory rights of use of the underlying land116 because the
burden on the land is something separate from the land itself.117
When Atlantic obtained a Special Use Permit right-of-way for the
Atlantic Coast Pipeline under the Appalachian Trail, the authority
to do so remained with the Secretary.118 Justice Thomas reasoned
the issuance of a right-of-way did not strip the Forest Service of
jurisdiction over the land underneath the Trail land119 because the

Justice Thomas concluded that “easements are not land” because they only
“burden land that continues to be owned by another.” Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at
1845 (citing Bruce, supra, at 1–2) (emphasis added)).
113. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1844 (citing Kelly, 64 S.E.2d at 613; Builders
Supplies Co. of Goldsboro, 192 S.E.2d at 453) (the majority established a right
of way is a type of easement that grants a nonowner a limited privilege to pass
through the estate of another); R. Powell & P. Rohan, supra note 112, at § 405;
Restatement (First) of Property, supra note 112, at § 450; BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY supra note 112, at 1489.
114. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1844-45 (citing Bunn v. Offutt, 222 S.E.2d
522, 525 (1976); Barnard v. Gaumer, 361 P.2d 778, 780 (1961); Minneapolis
Athletic Club v. Cohler, 177 N.W.2d 786, 789 (1970)).
115. J. Bruce & J. Ely, supra note 112, at 1-2.
116. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1844.
117. Id. at 1845. To elicit this point, Justice Thomas used the following
hypothetical:
If analyzed as a right-of-way between two private landowners,
determining whether any land had been transferred would be simple. If
a rancher granted a neighbor an easement across his land for a horse
trail, no one would think that the rancher had conveyed ownership over
that land. Nor would anyone think that the rancher had ceded his own
right to use his land in other ways, including by running a water line
underneath the trail that connects to his house. He could, however, make
the easement grantee responsible for administering the easement apart
from the land. Likewise, when a company obtains a right-of-way to lay a
segment of pipeline through a private owner's land, no one would think
that the company had obtained ownership over the land through which
the pipeline passes.
Id.

118. Id.
119. Id. at 1846 (reaching this conclusion by reading it in light of basic
property law principles, explaining
[T]he plain language of the Trails Act and the agreement between the
two agencies did not divest the Forest Service of jurisdiction over the
lands that the Trail crosses. It gave the Department of the Interior (and
by delegation the National Park Service) an easement for the specified
and limited purpose of establishing and administering a Trail, but the
land itself remained under the jurisdiction of the Forest Service.).
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Trails Act does not suggest a right-of-way transfers jurisdiction as
well as the land.120 Justice Sotomayor pointed out that the language
of the Trails Act actually extends authority, it does not usurp the
original agency authority.121
3. The Court Argued Under the Trails Act, the National
Park Service Has a Limited Role of Administering the
Trail as an Easement, but the Land Remained Within the
Forest Service
The Justices agreed Congress vested the Secretary of the
Interior with the administration of the Appalachian Trail,
regardless of the ownership of the land.122 Then, the Secretary
“designated the Park Service as the Trail’s ‘land administering
bureau.’”123 The Trail Act commanded for the Secretary, or by
delegation the National Park Service, to administer the
Appalachian Trail as a footpath.124 The Act mandated that the Park
Service administer the Appalachian Trail to ensure outdoor
recreation and to conserve “nationally significant scenic, historic,
natural, or cultural qualities.”’125 However, Justice Thomas
diverged from the consensus when he interpreted the Trail Act’s
command to be evidence that the National Park Service has only “a
limited role of administering a trail easement, but that the
underlying land remains within the jurisdiction of the Forest
Service.”126
Justice Thomas dismissed the Trail and Organic Acts’
reference to the physicality of the Trail as evidence that the Trail
and its land are one in the same because easements burden an area
of land bound particular metes and bounds.127 With this

120. Id. at 1845; Azar v. Allina Health Servs., 139 S. Ct. 1804, 1812 (2019)
(The Supreme Court cannot “lightly assume that Congress silently attaches
different meanings to the same term in the same . . . statute.”).
121. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1845, n. 3 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1248(a) (2022));
Bruce, supra note 112, at 1–5 (“A possessor and an easement holder can
simultaneously utilize the same parcel of land”).
122. Brief for Respondents, supra note 17, at 5 (“administ[ration] of the
entire Trail, no matter who owns the land”).
123. Brief for Respondents, supra note 17, at 5 (citing 34 Fed. Reg. 14,337,
14,337 (Sept. 12, 1969)).
124. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1847 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1244(a)(1) (2022)).
125.
Cowpasture,
140
S.
Ct.
at
1851
(citing
16 U.S.C. § 1242 (2022)) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Brief for Petitioner Atlantic
Coast Pipeline, LLC at 6, 8–9, Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. 1837 (Nos. 18-1584, 181587); Brief for Petitioners, at 9, 26, Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. 1837 (Nos. 18-1584,
18-1587); Brief for Respondents, supra note 17, at 5.
126. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1846.
127. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1845-46. Justice Thomas interpreted “the
Trails Act refer[al] to the granted interests as ‘rights-of-way,’ both when
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understanding of property law, he concluded that when the Forest
Service granted a right-of-way under the Appalachian Trail within
the National Park land they granted “only an easement across the
land, not jurisdiction over the land itself.”128
The majority construed the Trails Act’s mandate for the
Appalachian Trail to be ‘administered’ by the Park Service to ensure
recreation and conserve the Appalachian Trail’s qualities to mean
that the Forest Service is charged with designating the Trail’s
uses.129 Justice Thomas argued the Forest Service’s more
significant role of managing the necessary physical work duties of
the Trail is evidence of their retention of the land’s jurisdiction.130
Whereas, the National Park Service holds a more limited role of
administering the maintenance duties of the Trail.131 He reasoned
that the distinguishment of these roles is evidence that the Trail is
distinct from its land because there is a difference of how and who

describing agreements with the Federal Government and with private and state
property owners.” Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1845 (16 U.S.C. §§ 1246(a)(2), (e)
(2022). He then applied the aforementioned cannons of property law that a
right-of-way, “[w]hen applied to a private or state property owner . . . would
carry its ordinary meaning of a limited right to enjoy another’s land.”
Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1845; see supra note 112 (explaining how Justice
Thomas incorporated property law into his analysis). The Justice dismisses that
the Organic Acts reference to the Trail as an “area” because “[l]ike other rightof-way easements, the Trail burdens ‘a particular parcel of land.’” Cowpasture,
140 S. Ct. at 1845 (citing 54 U.S.C. §§ 100102(6), 100501 (2022)) (quoting Bruce,
supra note 112, at 1–6). The Justice continues to brush off the Trails Acts’
reference to “land” to be consistent with the conclusion that the Trail is a typical
easement with metes and bounds. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1846 (citing
Carnemella v. Sadowy, 147 App.Div.2d 874, 876 (N.Y. 1989); Sorrell v.
Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 314 S.W.2d 193, 195–96 (Ky. 1958))
128. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1845. Justice Thomas follows this conclusion
with another statute and definition, the MLA’s definition of “Federal Lands.”
Id. (citing 30 U.S.C. § 185(b) (2022)). Under the MLA, “federal lands” include
“all lands owned by the United States, except lands in the National Park
System, lands held in trust for an Indian or Indian tribe, and lands on the Outer
Continental Shelf.” 30 U.S.C. § 185(b) (2022). He concludes that
the Forest Service may grant a pipeline right-of-way through [Federal
lands]—just as it granted a right-of-way for the Trail. Sometimes a
complicated regulatory scheme may cause us to miss the forest for the
trees, but at bottom, these cases boil down to a simple proposition: A trail
is a trail, and land is land.
Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1846 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 185(b) (2022)).
129. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1846 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1244(a)(1) (2022))
These uses include providing Trail markers, presenting information to the
public about the Appalachian Trail, and passing regulations for the “protection,
management, development, and administration” of the Appalachian Trail.
Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1847 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 1246(c), (i) (2022)).
130. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1846-47 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 1246(h)(1), (i)
(2022)).
131. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1846-7 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1246(h)(1) (2022)).
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accomplishes the duties set out in the Trail Act.132 Still, Justice
Thomas failed to explain “how the Park Service could administer
the Trail without administering the land that forms it.”133
4. The Court Reasoned that the Lands that the Trail
Crosses Remain Under the Forest Service’s Jurisdiction
and Continue to be “Federal Lands” Under the Mineral
Leasing Act
The MLA enables the permitting of rights-of-way for naturalgas pipelines “through any Federal lands.”134 The term “federal
lands” is defined as “all lands owned by the United States except
lands in the National Park System.”135 The MLA mandates efforts
must be made to “minimize adverse environmental impacts” in a
right-of-way across Federal lands.136
After establishing the Forest Service’s jurisdiction over the
““Federal lands” within the George Washington National Forest,’”
Justice Thomas over-extended this conclusion to mean the
Appalachian Trail is “Federal Land” under the MLA.137 He reasoned
the MLA, in conjunction with the aforementioned canons of
property law, supports the notion that because the Forest Service’
retained jurisdiction over the land under the Trail, those lands were
Federal lands.138
In sum, the majority argued Congress did not use “unequivocal
and direct language” to indicate that Congress did not intend for
the Trail to be land in the Park System.139 Cowpasture reaffirmed a
clear-statement rule for transfers of jurisdiction between federal
agencies—it is not the courts’ place to infer a transfer of jurisdiction

132. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1857-58 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 1856.
134. Id. at 1852 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2022); Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at
1843 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 185(b) (2022) Under the MLA, “the ‘Secretary of the
Interior or appropriate agency head’ may grant pipeline rights-of-way across
‘Federal lands.’” Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1844 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 185(a)
(2022) (emphasis added). “The Forest Service is an ‘appropriate agency head’
for ‘Federal lands’ over ‘which [it] has jurisdiction.’ Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at
1844 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 185(a); (b)(3) (2022)).
135. 30 U.S.C. § 185(b)(1) (2022).
136. Sierra Club, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 897 F.3d 582, 604 (4th Cir. 2018)
(citing 30 U.S.C. § 185(p) (2021)).
137. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1844.
138. Id. at 1843, 1846; see supra note 112 (explaining how Justice Thomas
incorporated property law into his analysis). The majority’s final theory argued
the language of the Leasing Act mirrors the MLA because “the lands that the
Trail crosses are still “Federal lands.” Id.; 30 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2022). The
majority also argued that the Forest Service may grant a pipeline right-of-way
through them—just as it granted a right-of-way for the Trail. Cowpasture, 140
S. Ct. at 1843, 1846.
139. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1847.
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without a clear statement.140 Interestingly, shortly after ruling on
Cowpasture, the Court adopted a similar clear-statement rule in
McGirt v. Oklahoma where “only three members of
the Cowpasture majority – Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Gorsuch
— joined the McGirt majority.”141

B. The Dissent Read the Statutes Plainly to Conclude
There is a Legal Pairing Between the Trail and Its
Land
1. The Dissent Branded the Court’s Use of Property Law as
Unconvincing
At the outset of the dissenting opinion, Justice Sotomayor
observed the majority deployed a complicated discussion of property
law principles as a tool to mask the issue of the case.142 Arguing that
classifying the Appalachian Trail as an easement, rather than land,
is incorrect because it relied “on anything except the provisions that
actually answer the question presented.”143 The majority’s
reasoning is self-defeating because if the Forest Service granted the
Park Service an easement for the Appalachian Trail144 and an
easement is not land, then nothing “divest[ed] the Forest Service of
jurisdiction over the lands that the Trail crosses.”145 She reasoned
the discussion of private law easements was “unconvincing” because
the Federal Government owns all lands at issue here, an
uncontested fact in this case.146 It illogical to incorporate private
140. Id.
141. Lawson Fite, Cowpasture Decision Upholds Integrity of the National
Forest System, 52 TRENDS: ABA SECTION OF ENV’T, ENERGY, & RES. NEWSL.
(ABA, Chicago, Ill.), Sept./Oct. 2020, at 4, 7 (citing McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S.
Ct. 2452, 2462 (2020) (holding “[i]f Congress wishes to break the promise of a
reservation, it must say so”)).
142. Id. at 1850 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing “[t]he majority’s
complicated discussion of private-law easements, footpath maintenance,
differently worded statutes, and policy masks the simple (and only) dispute
here”).
143. Id. at 1851.
144. Id. at 1856.
145. Id.
146. Id. (breaking down the court misuse of property law by explaining
[i]n the Court’s words, a private-law easement is ‘a limited privilege’
granted to ‘a nonowner’ of land . . . But as the Court recognizes, ‘the
Federal Government owns all lands involved here,’ [] so private law is
inapposite. Precisely because the Government owns all the lands at
issue, it makes little sense to ask whether the Government granted itself
an easement over its own land under state-law principles. Between
agencies of the Federal Government, federal statutory commands, not
private-law analogies, govern).
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property law principles because the matter here did not involve
privately owned land, but it was a dispute over public federal
land.147
2. The Dissent Used the Organic Act’s Definition of “Area of
Land” to be Units of the Park System
Justice Sotomayor deployed the Organic Act’s definition of
“area of land” in a “common sense”148 analysis to conclude the Act
states the National Park System includes “any area of land”
administered by the Park Service.149 The Federal Government has
an extensive fifty-year history of referencing the Appalachian Trail
as a “‘unit’ of the National Park System.”150 In the Park System, a
“unit” is either land or water.151 As a “unit” of the National Park
System, the Trail and its “land” are conjoined.152 “Land” under the
Organic Act does not distinguish between units of the park system;
therefore, the Trail is a unit, or land, in the Park System, and ‘“no
federal agency’ has ‘authority under the [MLA] to grant a pipeline
right-of-way across such lands.”’153
In response to the majority opinion’s handling of the definition
of “area of land” under the Organic Act,154 Justice Sotomayor argued

147. Id. at 1856, n. 10 (“A right-of-way may include not just a right of
passage, but also the land itself.”); 16 U.S.C. § 521(e)(3) (2022) (providing that
certain ‘rights-of-way’ are ‘lands’); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1587 (11th ed.
2019) (‘right-of-way’ can refer to ‘[t]he strip of land’)).
148. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1851 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Those laws,
a half century of agency understanding, and common sense confirm that the
Trail is land, land on which generations of people have walked.”).
149. Brief for Respondents, supra note 20, at 5-6 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 911265, at 3 (1970) (“describing existing statutory authorities as “almost devoid
of uniformity.) Brief for Respondents, supra note 20, at 6 (citing 54 U.S.C. §
100101(b)(1)(B); § 100101(b)(1)(D) (2022) (stating legislative “purpose . . . to
include all these areas in the System and to clarify the authorities applicable to
the System. Congress created “one National Park System” that unambiguously
includes every area the Park Service administers”)).
150. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1851 (citing 54 U.S.C. §§ 100102(6), 100501
(2022)).
151. Id.
152. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1851.
153. Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioners, supra note 148, at 3.).
154. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1848 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 185(b)(1) (2022));
Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1854, n. 15 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (clarifying the
definition of “area of land” by writing:
The Court acknowledges that ‘the Government might refer to the Trail’
as ‘area of land,’ but concludes that those references must pertain only to
easements as defined by state law . . . .That view strays far from the
federal statutes at issue. The simpler conclusion is that when the
Government uses terms that define land in the Park System, the
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the majority’s line of reasoning neglected to explain “how the Trail
could be a unit of the Park System if it is not land.”155 The majority
opinion incorrectly concluded that the Appalachian Trail’s standing
as a “System unit” does not designate that the Trail and its land are
the same156 because there is no statutory authority to support that
conclusion. The majority’s logic, she explained, conflicts with the
Organic Act’s declaration that a ‘“System unit’ is by definition ‘land’
or ‘water.’”157 Justice Sotomayor writes that unless Justice Thomas
intended to imply the Appalachian Trail is water, the Trail is land
in the Park System.158
3. The Dissent Argued So Long as the National Park
Service Administers the Trail, the Trail is Land Within
the National Park System
While there was consensus that the Trails Act grants
“authority to the agency responsible for the Trail,”159 Justice
Sotomayor argued that this “only scratches the surface” of the Park
Service authority over the Appalachian Trail.160 The Park Service
has the authority to control “what happens under the Trail
consistent with ‘units of the national park system . . .’”161 and
advocate for the Appalachian Trail’s “protection, management,
development, and administration.”162 The Park Service has the
authority to determine what “uses along the trail” to permit.163
The dissent disagreed with Justice Thomas’s conclusion that
the Forest Service has the authority to grant a right-of-way under
the Appalachian Trail, but cannot “determin[e] whether a pipeline
bores across the Trail.”164 She alternatively argued Justice Thomas’
argument leads to the illogical conclusion that the MLA “would not
Government refers to land in the Park System.).
155. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1856 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
156. Id.
157. Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing 54 U.S.C. §§ 100102(6), 100501
(2022)) (arguing “[f]ederal law does not distinguish ‘land’ from the Trail any
more than it distinguishes ‘land’ from the many monuments, historic buildings,
parkways, and recreational areas that are also units of the Park System.”
Following this reasoning to its logical conclusion, “the Trail is land in the Park
System” and “‘no federal agency’ has ‘authority under the Mineral Leasing Act
to grant a pipeline right-of-way across such lands.’”).
158. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1856 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 1857.
160. Id.
161. Id. (citing § 1246(i)).
162. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1857 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
163. Id. (citing § 1246(c)).
164. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1857 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). “It is
undisputed that 16 U.S.C. § 1248 does not authorize rights-of-way for naturalgas pipelines. Atlantic therefore does not rely on this provision.” Id. at 1857, n.
5.
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even stop Atlantic from building a pipeline on top of an undisputed
unit of the Park System.”165 She branded the Court’s reasoning as
“atextual” and that it “cannot be right.”166 Rather, a plain reading
of the statutes leads to the logical conclusion that the Appalachian
Trail and its land are an inseparable couple.167
In response to the majority’s use of “two terms of art:
‘administering’ land and ‘managing’ it,”168 the dissent argued that a
plain reading of the Trails Act defeats the majority’s logic.169 In its
own words, the Trails Act differentiates between the terms “because
it uses both, but disclaims only the transfer of ‘management,’ not
‘administration.’”170 The Park Service uses “administration” to
reference “the agency broadly ‘responsible for Federal funding and
staffing necessary to operate the trail and exercising trail-wide
authorities from the [Trails Act] and [the administering agency's]
own organic legislation.”’171 “‘Management,’ by contrast, refers to
localized matters like ‘local visitor services,’ ‘law enforcement,’ ‘sitespecific compliance,’ ‘site interpretation,’ ‘trail maintenance’ and
‘marking,’ ‘resource preservation and protection,’ and ‘viewshed
protection.’”172 When Congress contains terms in one section of a
statute but omits them in another, the Supreme Court “generally
presumes” that “Congress ‘intended a difference in meaning.”’173
Justice Sotomayor reasoned so long as the National Park Service
“administers” the Trail, the Trail is land within the National Park
System.174
The Trails Act stipulates that the right-of-way “for the
Appalachian Trail ‘shall include lands protected for it’ where
‘practicable.’”175 Therefore, even for an “easement” through a federal
165. Id. at 1857.
166. Id. at 1856-57.
167. See generally id. at 1841-61 (focusing on statutory definitions as the
basis for the analysis).
168. Id. at 1858.
169. Id. at 1857 (citing § 1246(a)(1)(A)).
170. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1858.
171. Id. at 1858-59, n. 11 (citing National Park Service, National Trails
System:
Reference
Manual
45,
8
(Jan.
2019),
www.nps.gov/subjects/nationaltrailssystem/upload/Reference-Manual-45National-Trails-System-Final-Draft-2019.pdf
[perma.cc/KG7A-BY4Q]
[hereinafter NPS, Reference Manual]).
172. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1858 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 1857 (citing Maine Community Health Options v. United States,
140 S.Ct. 1308, 1323 (2020)).
174. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1859, n. 12 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Mere
months after Congress had enacted § 1246(a)(1)(A) to clarify that it had not
transferred “management responsibilities,” the Park Service issued a final rule
for “General Regulations for Areas Administered by the National Park Service,”
reaffirming that the Appalachian Trail was land in the Park System.”).
175. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1856 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing 16
U.S.C. § 1244(a)(1) (2022); cf. § 1246(d) (listing the “areas . . . included” in a
right-of-way); § 1246(e) (providing that the Government may “acquire such
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forest, “the Park Service still administers land “acquire[d]” and
“protected” for the Trail.”176 In reality, the Trails Act “undercuts the
Court’s distinction between a trail and land.”177 She explained, the
statute likens “components of the National Trails System” like the
Appalachian Trail to “lands.”’178 The language of the statutes
inextricably marries the Trail to its land.179
4. The Dissent Argued the Appalachian Trail is Land in the
National Park System, and the MLA does Not Permit
Pipeline Right-of-Way Across Those Lands
Justice Sotomayor argued that the plain statutory definition
indicates the Appalachian Trail is “land in the National Park
System,” and the MLA does not permit pipeline right-of-way across
those lands.180 The plain text of the MLA specifies ‘“Federal lands’
exclude[s] ‘lands in the National Park System.”181 Under the
statutory definition of “Federal lands,” no agency could rely on the
MLA for authority to grant a pipeline right-of-way that would cross
land in the National Park System.182
Under the MLA, it is feasible that the Appalachian Trail may
fall under the authority of multiple agencies.183 Justice Sotomayor
argued while the majority acknowledges this possibility,184 they
“[do] not follow it to its logical conclusion: that land may be in both
the Park Service and the Forest Service and thus excluded from the

lands or interests therein to be utilized as segments of” a trail and that “lands
involved in such rights-of-way should be acquired in fee”)).
176. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1857 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“That is
why the Park Service refers to the Trail as a ‘swath of land,’ . . . why the Forest
Service admits that the Park Service administers those ‘acres,’ . . . and why the
Secretary of the Interior has authority to grant rights-of-way ‘under’ the Trail’s
surface”).
177. Id. at 1858.
178. Id. (citing § 1241(b) (Appalachian Trail is a “componen[t]” of the
National Trails System); § 1246(a)(1)(A); Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. 1846 – 1847,
1850 (“Court elides two terms of art: “administering” land and “managing” it);
NPS, Reference Manual, supra note 172, at 21 (“Trail administration is
distinguished from on-the-ground trail management.”).
179. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1858.
180. Id. at 1853.
181. Id. at 1852 (citing § 185(b)).
182. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1852 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Brief
for Petitioners, supra note 148, at 3; Brief for Petitioner Atlantic Coast Pipeline
LLC, supra note 148, at 10; Brief for Respondents, supra note 20, at 1).
183. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1857-58 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing 30
U.S.C. § 185(c) (2022)); Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1860, n. 13 (citing NPS
Reference Manual, supra note 172, at 8) (“Park Service's ‘Trail administration
provides trail wide coordination and consistency’ among ‘government agencies,
landowners, interest groups, and individuals’”).
184. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1858 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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MLA’s right-of-way authority.”185 The Trails Act also supports this
shared authority scheme.186
The plain language of the MLA explains the difference between
administration and management of the Appalachian Trail land by
comparing land “under the jurisdiction of [a] Federal agency” to
land “administered” by that agency.187 While the majority argued
the use of the two different terms, administering and managing, to
be evidence that the Trail is distinct from its land,188 the dissent
clarified that the terms are not mutually exclusive, “the Park
Service administers the Appalachian Trail, even if the Forest
Service manages it.”189 Under this logic, the Trail and land are an
inseparable couple under the Trails Act190 and Organic Act191 as
well.192
5. The Dissent Relied on Congressional Intent to Argue the
Trail is a Part of the Park System
Justice Sotomayor introduced Congressional intent in her
analysis as further evidence the Appalachian Trail cannot be
divorced from its land.193 When Congress amended the MLA, in
response to a previously too broad definition of lands in the Park
System, it did so to further protect the public lands from being
penetrated by rights-of-way.194 The MLA, before its amendment,
185. Id. (citing § 185(b)) (The MLA “asks whether the federally owned land
is in the Park System at all. . . . If it is, then (as the parties recognize) the
Mineral Leasing Act does not permit pipelines to cross that park land.”).
186. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1857 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing 16
U.S.C. § 1244(a)(1); § 1246(a)(2) (2022)) (giving the Secretary of the Interior
administrative authority “in consultation with the Secretary of Agriculture . . .
Development and management of each segment of the National Trails System
shall be designed to harmonize with and complement any established multipleuse plans for that specific area.”).
187. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1858 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing 30
U.S.C. §§ 185(c)(1), (2) (2022)).
188. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1857-58 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 1859.
190. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1858 (citing Reference Manual, supra note
206, at 21) (The Trails Act, § 1246(a)(1)(A), differentiates the terms of
‘administering’ land and ‘managing’ it “because it uses both, but disclaims only
the transfer of ‘management,’ not ‘administration.’”).
191. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1858 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The
Organic Act defines the Park System as land “administered” by the Park
Service); 54 U.S.C. § 100501 (2022); see also § 100502 (reflecting difference
between administration and management).
192. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1858 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing §
5(a)(1), 82 Stat. 920) (“Similarly, the rest of the Trails Act differentiates the two
terms by giving the Secretary of the Interior (and by extension the Park Service)
power to ‘administe[r]’ the lands making up the Appalachian Trail, [] in
consultation with other parties about proper Trail ‘management.’”).
193. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1861 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 1853.

2022]

Supreme Court Forces Divorce for a Happily Married Couple

203

provided only restricted opportunity to grant a right-of-way through
public lands.195 “Public lands” is a “term of art referring to certain
federally owned land that had never been owned by a State or
private individual.”196 Currently, lands under the MLA are further
protected “by eliminating authority to grant [rights-of-way] across
those lands.”197
According to Justice Sotomayor, under the amended MLA,
‘“any area of land and water administered by’ the Park Service is a
unit of the Park System.”198 A Park System unit “must be
‘regulate[d]’ through ‘means and measures’ that ‘conserve’ and
‘provide for the enjoyment of the scenery, natural and historic
objects, and wild life’ in ways ‘as will leave them unimpaired for the
enjoyment of future generations.”’199 There is no doubt the
Appalachian Trail qualifies as a Park System unit and therefore
Atlantic may not rely on the MLA to obtain a Special Use Permit.200
Justice Sotomayor argued the majority’s reliance on the Rivers
Act and the Blue Ridge Parkway statutes was unwarranted.201 The
Rivers Act mandates any section of the Rivers System would
“‘become a part of’ the National Park System”202 which
demonstrated that “Congress has many means to make land a unit
of the Park System,”203 such as the General Authorities Act.204
Similarly, the dissent argued that Blue Ridge Parkway statutes
“did not include language about ‘transferring’ land from one agency
to another,” but stated that the parkway “shall be administered and
maintained by the Secretary of the Interior through the National
Park Service” and be “‘subject to’ the [Organic Act,] even though the
relevant lands included national forests.”205 The Rivers Act and the
195. § 28, 41 Stat. 449.
196. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1853 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Wallis
v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 65, n. 2 (1966)).
197. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1853 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 1853-54 (citing 54 U.S.C. §§ 100101, 100501 (2022)).
199. Id.
200. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1854 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 1859.
202. 16 U.S.C. § 1281 (2022).
203. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. 1859 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
204. Id. (Justice Thomas explains the context of and use of the General
Authorities Act. He describes it as
“a statute just as explicit as the Rivers Act. Again, it was after the Park
Service had become the Trail’s “land administering bureau,” 34 Fed. Reg.
14337, that Congress provided that “‘any area of land . . . now or hereafter
administered by the Secretary of the Interior through the National Park
Service’” is land in the Park System, § 2(b), 84 Stat. 826; see also 54 U.S.C. §§
100102(2), (6), 100501 (2022). Resembling the Rivers Act, the General
Authorities Act unambiguously provided that a component of the Trails System
would become land in the National Park System.”).
205. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1859 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing 49
Stat. 2041; ch. 277, 54 Stat. 249–250; NPS, Blue Ridge Parkway: Virginia and
North Carolina Final General Management Plan 12 (2013)).
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Blue Ridge Parkway statutes exemplify that Congress intended to
protect and strengthen the coupling of a trail and its land.206

C. The Dissent Argued Not Only Is There a Legal
Pairing Between the Trail and Its Land, but that
There is also a Practical One
Not only do the relevant interlocking statutes confirm that the
Appalachian Trail is land, but “a half century of agency
understanding, and common sense” demonstrates the Trail’s
obvious marriage to the land.207 Justice Sotomayor explained the
Appalachian Trail is “land on which generations of people have
walked.”208 Ignoring blatant agency practice, the majority opinion
argued “[i]f a tree falls on forest lands over the trail, it’s the Forest
Service that’s responsible for it,” not the Park Service.209 This
scenario was argued at oral argument,210 and accordingly the Court
found this hypothetical convincing, as Justice Thomas wrote the
National Park System “has a limited role of administering a trail
easement, but that the underlying land remains within the
jurisdiction of the Forest Service.”211
Instead, the dissent introduced agency practice as evidence
that the Park Service acknowledged that the Appalachian Trail is
land within the Park System.212 Justice Sotomayor explained the
Secretary of Interior designated the Park Service as the “land
administering bureau” for the Trail.213 The Park Service recognized
the Trail as a recreational area that it administered.214 As
administrator of that land, the Park Service issued regulations for
the Trail under the umbrella, “Areas of the National Park
System;”215 so the “statutory purposes of units of the National Park
System” would be fulfilled.216 “All those terms—land, area,
administer, recreation, unit of the National Park System—trace the
206. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1859 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 1851.
208. Id. at 1851, n. 4 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 112, at
1967 (“The legal meaning of ‘land’ when Congress enacted the relevant statutes
was ‘any ground, soil, or earth whatsoever.’”).
209. Id. at 1847.
210. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 3, at 5.
211. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1846.
212. Id. at 1854.
213. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1854 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing 34
Fed. Reg. 14337).
214. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1854 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing
National Park Service (NPS), National Parks & Landmarks 88).
215. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1854 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing 36
C.F.R. pt. 7 (1983) (capitalization deleted); § 7.100; 48 Fed. Reg. 30252 (1983)).
216. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1854 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing 36
C.F.R. § 1.1 (2021); 48 Fed. Reg. 30275).
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Organic Act’s definition of land in the Park System.”217 Congress’
implementation of terms indicate the Trail and land are unified.218
The dissent offered other evidence of the Park Service’s
importance to the Trail. The Park Service became responsible for
protecting and maintaining the Trail within federally administered
areas when the Trail was introduced in the National Park System
by the Trails Act.219 Even so, a Park Service handbook,220 reference
manual,221 compendium of regulations,222 budget justification to
Congress,223 and acreage estimations224 identify the Trail as part of
the Park Service. Extensive agency literature is evidence that the
Trail and the land that forms it are an inseparable couple.225

217. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1854 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing 54
U.S.C. §§ 100102(6), 100501 (2022)).
218. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1859 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
219. Id. at 1854 (citing NAT’L PARK SERV., THE NATIONAL PARKS: SHAPING
THE SYSTEM 77 (1991), www.npshistory.com/publications/shaping-the-system1991.pdf [perma.cc/3ZZC-9WK2]).
220. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1854 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing NPS,
Management Policies 2006, § 9.2.2.7, p. 134) (The Park Service handbook
explains that “[s]everal components of the National Trails System which are
administered by the [Park] Service,” including the Appalachian Trail, “have
been designated as units of the national park system” and “are therefore
managed as national park areas.”); NPS, Management Policies 2006, § 9.2.2.7,
p. 134. (A 2016 Park Service index similarly listed the Trail as “a unit of the
National Park System.”)).
221. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1855 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing NPS,
Reference Manual, supra note 172, at 28) (“[T]he Park Service issued a reference
manual describing the Appalachian Trail as a ‘land protection project’ that has
‘been formally declared [a] uni[t] of the National Park System.’”).
222. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1855 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing NPS,
Appalachian Trail Superintendent's Compendium 2 (2019)) (“The Park
Service’s compendium of regulations similarly explains that the General
Authorities Act “brought all areas administered by the [Park Service] into one
National Park System.”)).
223. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1855 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Dept.
of Interior, Budget Justifications and Performance Information—Fiscal Year
2020: National Park Service, at Overview–16, ONPS–89, –105 (Budget
Justifications) (capitalization deleted)) (“Even the Park Service's recent budget
justification to Congress identified the Appalachian Trail as a ‘Park Base
Uni[t],’ a ‘Park Uni[t],’ and a national ‘par[k].’”).
224. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1855 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing NPS,
Land Resources Div., Acreage Reports, Listing of Acreage, p. 1 (Dec. 31, 2019)
(NPS, 2019 Acreage Report) (“The Park Service’s Land Resources Division
estimates that the Appalachian Trail corridor constitutes nearly 240,000
acres.”); Dept. of Agriculture, Revised Land and Resource Mgmt. Plan–George
Washington Nat. Forest 4–42 (2014) (Forest Service Land Plan) (“In its own
management plan, the Forest Service explained that the Secretary of the
Interior “administer[s]” in the George Washington National Forest “about 9,000
acres.” Ibid. Acres of land, that is.”)).
225. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1854-55 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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IV. ANALYSIS
The Cowpasture Court incorrectly severed the Appalachian
Trail from “the land upon which it exists,”226 through an analysis
that avoided a logical conclusion. The Trail and its land are both
legally paired under a plain reading of the statutes and practically
paired, as the environmental impacts implicate both the trail and
its land equally.
First, this note will argue there is a legal pairing between the
Trail and the land that forms it. Its subsections will examine how a
plain reading of the Organic Act, the Trails Act, and the MLA shows
that this pairing is inseparable. Next, this note will contend that
there is a practical pairing between the Trail and its land because
(1) the Forest Service’s implementation of the term “Trail” indicates
the Appalachian Trail and land are an inseparable pair; (2) the
discussion at the Cowpasture oral argument encompasses the
practical paring; and (3) the construction of the Trail will have
lasting impacts on the Trail and its land and the majority ignored
peer-reviewed science that demonstrates construction has lasting
implications on the land. While the dissent touched on the
environmental consequences of construction, the seriousness of the
impacts demanded more attention.

A. The Dissent Correctly Read the Statutes Plainly to
Conclude There is a Legal Pairing Between the Trail
and Its Land
1. The Majority’s Attempt to Dilute the Clear Definitions
Provided in the Organic Act and Trails Act with a
Complicated Discussion of Property Law was
Unsubstantiated
Justice Sotomayor plainly read the statutes to derive
definitions and apply them in a common-sense manner in contrast
to the majority’s propensity to stretch each definition to shift their
meanings.227 The dissent correctly branded the majority’s opinion
reasoning as wrong and atextual because the Court should not have
construed these statutes in a way that defeats the underlying
purpose of protecting the land.228

226. Giannetti, supra note 4.
227. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1861 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 1857; 82 C.J.S. Ordinary meaning extended or restricted by court
§ 416
(2021) (citations omitted) (“Although a court must give words
their plain and ordinary meanings in interpreting a statute, in so doing the
court must not construe the statute in a way that would defeat the underlying
purpose of the enactment”).
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The Organic Act clearly defines “area of land” to mean land
within the National Park System administered by the Park
Service.229 Analyzing how that definition was applied in Park
history enabled the dissent’s conclusion that “land” under the
Organic Act does not distinguish between “units” of the park
system.230 The Trail is a “unit,” and its land are under the purview
of the Park System, meaning that ‘“no federal agency’ has ‘authority
under the [MLA] to grant a pipeline right-of-way across such
lands.”’231
The majority ignored the plain language of the Organic Act by
reading property law into the statute.232 Property law principles
acted as the glue to patch the three relevant statutes—Organic Act,
Trails Act, and MLA—together in a manner that divorced the legal
and practical pairing of the Appalachian Trail from its land.233
However, the federal government’s steadfast history of referring to
the Trail as a unit belied this interpretation and leads to the logical
conclusion that the government is referring to lands in the Park
System.234
Justice Thomas attempted to dilute a plain language of the
Trails Act through a messy discussion of property law.235 The
majority dismisses the Trail Acts’ language that ‘“rights-of-way’ for
the Appalachian Trail ‘shall include lands protected for it’ where
‘practicable.’”236 The Trails Act describes the Trail as a right-of-way
“that traces a specified route.”237 The term “right-of-way” is not
bound to just the limited right of someone to pass through another’s
land.238 In actuality, a right-of-way is for “public purpose” to
229. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1851 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 148, at 154); see Brief for Respondents, supra
note 20, at 5-6 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 91-1265, at 3 (1970) (describing the
Organics Acts’ lack of uniformity). Congress created “one National Park
System” that unambiguously includes every area the Park Service
administers.” Brief for Respondents, supra note 20, at 6 (citing 54 U.S.C. §
100101(b)(1)(B) (2022)); see § 100101(b)(1)(D) (stating legislative “purpose . . .
to include all these areas in the System and to clarify the authorities applicable
to the System”.
230. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1851 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 148, at 3).
231. Id.
232. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1856 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
233. See generally id. at 1841-61 (Justice Thomas used elements from
different statutes to inform his analysis).
234. Id. at 1856 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); 1854 n. 8.
235. See supra Section III.B.2 (providing a summary of how Justice Thomas
incorporated property law).
236. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1856 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing 16
U.S.C. § 1244(a)(1); § 1246(d), (e) (2022)).
237. Brief for Amici Curiae Natural Resources Defense Council, et al. in
Support of Respondents at 8, Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1837 (Nos. 18-1584, 181587) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1244(a)(1) (2022)).
238. New Mexico v. U.S. Tr. Co., 172 U.S. 171, 181-182
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construct a trail.239 Rather than adopting the clear history of the
term right-of-way in the context of a public use like the Appalachian
Trail—a right-of-way is “[t]he strip of land subject to a nonowner’s
right to pass through”240—the majority opinion opted for a more
complicated discussion of easements and transfer of jurisdiction
between agencies.241
As the Natural Resources Defense Council argued in its brief,
the Trails Act functions only by recognizing the “designated ‘trails’
as the strip of land on which they exist.”242 Trails only permit
specific types of uses on the land on which they exist;243 for example,
only certain portions of the trail allow for the use of vehicles. Justice
Sotomayor recognized the uses laid out in the Trails Act apply to
“the land that makes up a trail, not only the route a trail takes.”244
Moreover, the Trails Act’s appropriation of funds — “for the
acquisition of lands or interests in lands [for the] Trail”245 supports
the dissents’ logical conclusion that the Appalachian Trail and the
land are not severable.246 The plain language of the Trails Act —
the permitted uses and appropriation of funds — reinforces the
“Trail cannot be separated from the land that constitutes it.”247
2. The Mineral Leasing Act Demonstrates that the Park
Service Administers the Appalachian Trail, and the Trail
is Within the National Park System
Not only did Justice Sotomayor’s review of the plain text
support her conclusion, but also a review of the MLA proves just as
convincing. Again, since the MLA excludes Federal lands from the
National Park System, thus making the Appalachian Trail part of

(1898) (quoting Keener v. Union Pac. Ry., 31 F. 126, 128 (D. Colo. 1887)).
239. Brief for Amici Curiae Natural Resources Defense Council, supra note
307, at 9 (citing Keener, 31 F. at 128)); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1522 (10th ed.
2014) (defining “right-of-way,” as, inter alia, “[t]he strip of land subject to a
nonowner's right to pass through”) (emphasis added)).
240. Amici Curiae Natural Resources Defense Council, supra note 238, at 8
(citing 16 U.S.C. § 1244(a)(1) (2022)) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra
note 276, at 1522).
241. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1844.
242. Brief for Amici Curiae Natural Resources Defense Council, supra note
307, at 9.
243. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1246(j) (2022)) (“The Act, for example, specifies
the types of ‘trail uses allowed on designated components of the national trails
system,’ including ‘bicycling, cross-country skiing, day hiking, [and] equestrian
activities,’ and the types of ‘[v]ehicles which may be permitted on certain trails,’
including ‘motorcycles’ and ‘four-wheel drive or all-terrain off-road vehicles.’”).
244. Brief for Amici Curiae Natural Resources Defense Council, supra note
307, at 9.
245. Id. at 9-10 (citing § 1249(a)(1)).
246. Id.
247. Brief for Respondents, supra note 20, at 3.
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the National Park System,248 it prohibits the Forest Service from
issuing a pipeline right-of-way under the Appalachian Trail.249 In
fact, under the MLA’s expressed definition of “Federal lands,” no
agency could rely on the MLA for authority to grant a pipeline rightof-way that would cross the Appalachian Trail.250
The plain language of the MLA gives a clear direction “that the
Park Service administers the Appalachian Trail, even if the Forest
Service manages it.”251 In contrast to the majority’s attempt to
patch the statutes in a way to argue against that conclusion, the
dissent was able to demonstrate each statute on its own—the MLA,
the Trails Act,252 and Organic Act253—lead to the conclusion the
trail and land are indivisible.

B. The Dissent Correctly Read the Statutes Plainly to
Conclude There is a Practical Pairing Between the
Trail and Its Land
1. The Forest Service’s Implementation of the Term “Trail”
Means the Trail and Its Land are an Inseparable Pair
Not only is it evident from the clear text of the relevant
statutes that the Appalachian Trail and its land are legally paired,
but it is also apparent from the Forest Service’s implementation of
the word “trail.” The agency used the term “trail” in a manner
consistent with both the layman definitions of “land” as the land
beneath ones feet and in a legal context as ground “regarded as the
subject of ownership . . . and everything annexed to it, whether by
nature . . . or by man.’”254 As evident from the majority’s analysis,
248. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1852 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing §
185(b)).
249. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1853.
250. Id. at 1852 (citing Brief for Petitioners, supra note 148, at 3; Brief for
Petitioner Atlantic Coast Pipeline LLC, supra note 148, at 10; Brief for
Respondents, supra note 20, at 1).
251. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1859 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
252. Id. at 1858. “For another, in relying on this provision, the Court elides
two terms of art: ‘administering’ land and ‘managing’ it.” See id. (citing id. at
1846-47, 1850). The Trail Act’s use of administration “is distinguished from onthe-ground trail management” because “it uses both [terms], but disclaims only
the transfer of ‘management,’ not ‘administration.’” Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at
1859 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Reference Manual, supra note 210, at
21; § 1246(a)(1)(A) (2022)).
253. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1858 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The
Organic Act defines the Park System as land “administered” by the Park
Service); 54 U.S.C. § 100501 (2022); see also § 100502 (reflecting difference
between administration and management).
254. Brief for Respondents, supra note 20, at 23 (citing WEBSTER'S NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1388 (2d ed. 1950); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1268 (2002)); BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1019 (4th
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they used creative definitions, such as conflating definitions of
public lands with private lands law, to detour from the plain
definitions and common sense—“The Appalachian Trail is ‘land’: a
part of the earth's surface defined by a worn, marked path.”255
The majority turned a blind eye to not only the ordinary
English usage of “Trail” and “Land,”256 but also to the profound
history of the federal government’s use of “land” in this ordinary
sense to reference the Appalachian Trail as land.257 The Forest
Service’s records use the Trail and land synonymously,258 and the
Appalachian Trail’s 1981 Comprehensive Plan (“Plan”) treats the
pairing as inseparable as well.259 The Plan’s purpose is to present
Congress with the necessary information to meet its oversight
responsibility for the Appalachian Trail and states that “[t]he body
of the Trail is provided by the lands it traverses.”’260 Throughout the
federal government, therefore, there has been a historical and
widespread view of the Trail and Land as an inseparable pair, even
to the extent that the individual terms can be used interchangeably.
2. The Oral Argument Explained Why There is a Practical
Pairing Between the Trail and Its Land
The oral argument elucidated further fault lines and flaws in
the majority’s argument. The Court’s metaphysical perspective on
the relationship between the Trail and its land was evident during
oral argument. In contrast, in her dissent Justices Sotomayor took
a practical analysis.
Anthony Yang and Paul Clement, counsel for the petitioners,
argued a right-of-way that crosses 600 feet under the Appalachian

rev. ed. 1968)).
255. Brief for Respondents, supra note 20, at 23-4.
256. Brief for Respondent, supra note 20, at 24 (citing NPS Reference
Manual, supra note 172, at 221) (“Those examples show that the government's
strained trail-land distinction has nothing to do with ordinary English.”).
257. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 20, at 23-24 (recounting the
(citing WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1388 (2d ed. 1950)). See
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1268 (2002) (similar); see
also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1019 (4th rev. ed. 1968) (“any ground, soil, or
earth whatsoever” and “also things of a permanent nature affixed thereto or
found therein”).
258. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 20, at 24 (providing a history of
the Forest Services’ interchangeable use of Trail and Land). For example, the
Forest Service issued a Reference Manual describing ‘[t]he Appalachian Trail’
as ‘a unique land protection project.’” Id. (citing NPS Reference Manual, supra
note 172, at 221).
259. Comprehensive Plan for the Protection, Management, Development and
Use of the Appalachian National Scenic Trail, NAT’L PARK SERV., Addendum 3;
1 (1981), www.americantrails.org/files/pdf/ATCompPlan.pdf [perma.cc/6F53RZW9].
260. Id.
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Trail distinguished the Trail from the land.261 Justice Alito, who
joined the majority, found this argument compelling, stating “when
I think of a pipeline that is 600 feet below the surface, that doesn't
seem like a trail . . . can’t we just say that the trail is on the surface
and something that happens 600 feet below the surface is not the
trail?”262 The Court’s affinity to divorce the trail and “the land upon
which it exists”263 was based on the legal fiction of an abstract
distance that was apparent in the oral argument and the Court’s
opinion.264
Justices Sotomayor and Kagan noted during oral argument
that this conjectural attempt to separate the Trail from its land was
weak and ill-founded. Justice Kagan provided a quick retort to
Yang’s 600 feet argument, stating that “[i]t’s a . . . difficult
distinction to wrap one’s head around, Mr. Yang. You’re saying the
trail is distinct from . . . the land that is the trail. I don’t really quite
know how to say it except that nobody makes this distinction in real
life.”265 She also commented that the petitioner’s briefs were
“strange to read because you can’t ever just say what you mean,
which is that the trail is a piece of land.”’266 Justice Kagan correctly
identified how the petitioners were attempting to wedge something
between the trail and “the land upon which it exists”267 because in
reality, the trail is as much land as the land is the trail. Justice
Sotomayor translated the practical understanding to her dissent.
The majority opinion was mistakenly distracted by the distance of
the pipe to the Appalachian Trail.268
Moreover, in this case, distance is irrelevant in deciding the
relationship between the Appalachian Trail and its land because
even at 600 feet, the pipeline would impact both the surface of the
Appalachian Trail’s land. Ruptures of pipeline are common269 and
have disastrous environmental consequences.270 When crude oil or
petroleum products leak from a pipeline into the environment, they

261. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 3, at 7-8; 20; Sullivan &
Wamsley, supra note 30 (“Anthony Yang . . . sought to disentangle the trail from
the land beneath it, so that the pipeline could proceed under the permit granted
by the Forest Service.”).
262. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 3, at 21-22.
263. Giannetti, supra note 4.
264. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1842; 1844; n. 7.
265. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 3, at 10-11.
266. Id. at 12.
267. Id.; Giannetti, supra note 4.
268. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct at 1844.
269. G. Kousiopoulos et al., Pipeline Leak Detection in Noisy
Environment, 8TH INT’L CONF. ON MODERN CIRCUITS & SYSTEMS TECH. 1-5,
(2019) (for example, “according to Canada’s National Energy Board, over thirty
federally regulated pipelines ruptured between 1992 and 2011, three of which
released over 3,000 m³ of oil.”).
270. Id.
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are highly combustible and toxic.271 Justice Kagan’s view of the land
and Trail as indivisible makes sense, both from her practical
example and from the perspective of the more specific implications
of the proposed pipeline.

C. Construction of the Trail Will Have Lasting Impacts
on the Trail, and Therefore Environmental Impacts
Should Have Had More Consideration
1. The Court Ignored Peer-Reviewed Science that
Construction has Lasting Implications on the Land
The Appalachian Trail is practically paired with the land on
which it traverses, as the environmental impacts effect both the
trail and its land equally. The federal government, petitioners, put
forth the strained argument that even the Atlantic Coast Pipeline
would “do much for the environment” and preventing its
construction would “not even promote environmental protection.”272
These claims ignore the peer-reviewed science proving that
pipelines contribute to climate change, and there is a genuine “need
to offset energy services provided by natural gas infrastructure with
zero-carbon renewable energy alternatives and investments in
energy efficiency.”273 The United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change deemed it essential that reliance on natural gas
be reduced by thirteen to sixty-two percent by 2050.274 The ACP is
a commitment to the use of natural gas for the foreseeable future,
which is clearly at odds with the United Nation’s guidance.275
The ACP would cause significant deforestation of the
Appalachian Trail by clear cutting a 125-foot path of trees and
vegetation through a National Forest.276 This deforestation is
271. Gasoline explained: Gasoline and the environment, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN. (Nov. 19, 2020), www.eia.gov/energyexplained/gasoline/gasoline-andthe-environment.php [perma.cc/HWG5-NBGZ].
272. Brief for Petitioner Atlantic Coast Pipeline LLC, supra note 148, at 47.
273. Brief of the City of Staunton, Virginia et al. as Amici Curiae in Support
of Respondents at 11, Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. 1837 (Nos. 18-1584, 18-1587);
Exec. Order No. 14008, 86 Fed. Reg. 7619 (Jan. 27, 2021) (President Biden
proclaimed “We must listen to science—and act. . . . We must hold polluters
accountable for their actions. We must deliver environmental justice in
communities all across America.”).
274. Brief of the City of Staunton, supra note 343, at 11 (citing ROGEL, J.,
ET AL., MITIGATION PATHWAYS COMPATIBLE WITH 1.5°C IN THE CONTEXT OF
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 97 (2018) (Masson-Delmotte et al. eds.)); Exec.
Order No. 14008, supra note 310 (President Biden rejoined the Paris Climate
Agreement and pledged the “United States will exercise its leadership to
promote a significant increase in global climate ambition to meet the climate
challenge”).
275. Brief for City of Staunton, supra note 346, at 11.
276. Emily Brown, Dominion touts Atlantic Coast Pipeline progress,
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devastating to the critical habitat of threatened and endangered
species.277 For example, the Little Brown Bat will face an increase
in predation and a loss of roosting habitat.278 Additionally,
deforestation in this ecologically important area could have
disastrous consequences as the ecosystem has steep, mountainous
slopes279 that are “vulnerable to catastrophic mudslides, landslides
and Hurricanes.”280 Nelson County, which the ACP bisects, has
expressed a long-founded concern that the ACP would traverse its
“most scenic, rugged, and undeveloped terrain,” and would be
destructive to the cornerstone of the County’s economy, tourism.281
Furthermore, the ACP would impact water supply in Virginia
by cutting through the critical aquifer recharge area of Gardner
Spring,282 which produces 4.5 million gallons of waters per day.283
In addition, the construction of the ACP will negatively impact air
quality by emitting “particulate matter, inorganic dust and abrasive
dust.”284
mountain construction concerns opponents, NELSON CNTY. TIMES (Apr. 27,
2017), www.atlanticcoastpipeline.com/news/2017/4/27/dominion-touts-atlanticcoast-pipeline-progress-mountain-construction-concerns-opponents.aspx
[perma.cc/8DLP-QAW4].
277. Threats, Deforestation and Forest Degradation, WORLD WILDLIFE
FOUND., www.worldwildlife.org/threats/deforestation-and-forest-degradation
[perma.cc/8S3V-3KKM] (last visited Dec 30, 2020).
278. Cowpasture, 911 F.3d at 158.
279. Brief of the City of Staunton, supra note 343, at 13 (citing Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, Final Impact Statement, ATLANTIC COAST
PIPELINE & SUPPLY HEADER PROJ., Vol. I, Docket Nos. CP15-554-000, CP15554-001, CP15-555-000, and CP15-556-000 FERC/EIS-0274F, at 4-30 (July
2017).
280. Jeffrey Halverson, Unprecedented rain: Hurricane Camille’s Deadly
Flood in the Blue Ridge Mountains, WASH. POST (Aug. 19, 2013),
www.washingtonpost.com/news/capital-weathergang/wp/2013/08/19/unprecedented-rain-hurricane-camilles-deadly-dlood-inthe-blue-ridge-mountains/ [perma.cc/TN78-BG3E]; Final Environmental
Impact Statement, supra note 326.
281. Nelson County Board of Supervisors, Resolution in Opposition of the
Atlantic Coast Pipeline (Sept. 9, 2014).
282. Brief of the City of Staunton, supra note 343, at 12.
283. Brief of the City of Staunton, supra note 343, at 12 (citing City of
Staunton Comprehensive Plan 2018-2040, at 8-22; Letter from the Hon.
Carolyn W. Dull, Mayor, City of Staunton, to Ms. Julia Wellman, Va. Dep’t.
Envtl.
Quality
(Feb.
21,
2017),
www.abralliance.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/03/Staunton-City-Council-letter-of-opposition-toACP.pdf.) The City of Staunton concern of the ACP’s negative implications on
their water supply is long founded. Id. The City claimed that owners of the ACP
and the Federal Energy Regulation Commission “have utterly failed to account
yet for the potentially catastrophic consequences of the project as to the route
of the line that would be unacceptably within the ambit of our water source
known as Gardner Spring.” Id. Their concern is rooted in the vitality of the
recharge area, “because the bulk of the water that feeds Gardner Spring comes
from an extensive underground aquifer system.” Id.
284. Tomareva et al., IOP Conf. Series: Materials Science and Engineering,
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The Forest Service commented that Construction of the ACP
will cause “irreversible [negative] impacts to the soil and vegetation
resources” on National Forest System lands.285 They concluded that,
no matter the method used to construct the pipeline, “there will still
be an unavoidable irreversible dedication of the soil resource as
defined by [National Environmental Policy Act.]”286 These
consequences would ripple beyond the construction area
permeating through the soil and vegetation.287 Construction would
ultimately “eliminate the stable, resident plant community”288 and
cause significant soil loss, which will take years to recover.289
Executive Order 12898 requires all federal agencies, including
the Forest Service, to take steps to avoid inequitable environmental
outcomes.290 Here, it is obvious that the flora, fauna, and the hikers
will experience inequitable environmental outcomes as a direct
consequence of construction of the ACP. The Trail and its land will
be equally affected from such a disturbing construction project
because they are a married pair: both will be equally affected as
they are one and the same.
2. While the Dissent Touched on the Implications of
Constructions, the Seriousness of Impacts Warranted
More Attention
To Justice Sotomayor’s credit, the dissent briefly touched on

IOP
SCIENCE
5
(2017),
www.iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1757899X/262/1/012168/pdf [perma.cc/Y3RN-VKRQ].
285. Cowpasture, 911 F.3d at 157 (citing Corrected Deferred Joint Appendix,
supra note 25, at 2445); Tony, supra note 53 (Virginia, West Virginia, and North
Carolina all required extensive cleanup and restoration plans to remedy the
construction that had occurred before the ACP was canceled).
286. Cowpasture, 911 F.3d at 157 (citing Corrected Deferred Joint Appendix,
supra note 25, at 2445.
287. Jun Xiao et al., Potential effects of large linear pipeline construction on
soil and vegetation in ecologically fragile regions, 186 ENV’T MONITORING &
ASSESSMENT 8037, 8037 (2014).
288. Id.
289. Cowpasture, 911 F.3d at 166 (citing Corrected Deferred Joint Appendix,
supra note 25, at 2445).
290. Sierra Club v. FERC, 867 F.3d 1357, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“The
principle of environmental justice encourages agencies to consider whether the
projects they sanction will have a ‘disproportionately high and adverse’ impact
on low-income and predominantly minority communities.”); Heather Hansman,
The Supreme Court Approved More Drilling Under the AT, OUTSIDE MAG. (Jun.
25, 2020) www.outsideonline.com/2415115/dominion-energy-appalachian-traildrilling-supreme-court-decision [perma.cc/99L2-TKA6] (“The whole point of the
federal regulatory and permitting system is to calmly analyze projects, to make
sure they’re necessary and do the least harm. There’s a reason why we make
infrastructure go through so many steps—to keep the public (and public lands)
as protected as possible.”).
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how the construction would negatively impact the land.291 She
noted “[c]onstruction noise will affect Appalachian Trail use 24
hours a day” and “Atlantic’s machinery (including the artificial
lights required to work all night) will dim the stars visible from the
Trail.”292 Concluding construction would “unavoidably” lead to “to
ecological disturbance since there are clearing of vegetation,
excavation, [and] soil compaction.”293 Though Justice Sotomayor
gave consideration of the ecological impacts in her analysis, the
lasting damage on the land warranted more attention.
The ACP is an invasive construction project that will
fundamentally change the character and health of the Appalachian
Trail. The Trail would endure blasting, burrowing, drilling, and
deforestation during construction for which the consequences of
eradication of species and resources would long outlast the final
bulldozer.294 The nearby eco-environment would continue to
degrade long after the construction stops.295

V. CONCLUSION
The majority’s opinion disregarded the conservation goals for
the Appalachian Trail when it forced separation of the Trail from
the land that forms it. Justice Thomas excused the Forest Service’s
failure to promote conservation over recreation on the Appalachian
Trail despite an express directive from Congress.296 The lasting
environmental consequences on the Appalachian Trail are
unavoidable if a massive natural gas construction project is
implemented. This environmental degradation of America’s longest
scenic trail is a clear violation of the Organic Act’s prohibition on
incompatible consumption uses,297 such as a natural gas pipeline,
and impairs the land’s resources and values.298 Similarly, the
291. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1851 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
292. Id.
293. Tomareva, supra note 317, at 1.
294. Cowpasture, 911 F.3d at 155.
295. Xiao et al., supra note 320, at 8037.
296. See generally Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1841-51 (Justice Thomas does
not meaningfully discuss the failure to promote conversation); Nat’l Parks
Conservation Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 835 F.3d 1377, 1386 (11th Cir.
2016).
297. Mich. United Conservation Clubs v. Lujan, 949 F.2d 202, 207 (6th Cir.
1991).
298. Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Kempthorne, 577 F. Supp. 2d 183, 190
(D.D.C. 2008). The “fundamental purpose” of the Park Service “is to conserve
the scenery, natural and historic objects, and wildlife in the System units and
to provide for the enjoyment of the scenery, natural and historic objects, and
wild life in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for
the enjoyment of future generations.” Id. Uses of a “unit” of a National Park
System must “be conducted in light of the high public value and integrity of the
System and shall not be exercised in derogation of the values and purposes for
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Court’s majority opinion ignored the Trails Act’s mandate to
promote “the conservation and enjoyment of the . . . areas through
which [national scenic] trails may pass.”299 To use the Forest
Service’s own words: “Miles of line do not necessarily equate to
severity of the environmental impact. The nature of the resources
to be impacted needs to be considered.”300 The majority snubbed the
environmental impacts of construction and consequently ignored
the will of Congress.
The majority’s opinion also ignored the practical pairing of the
Trail to its land. The majority opinion was distracted by the
distance of the pipe from the surface of the Trail;301 distance does
not eliminate the impact on the land that is the Trail. If there was
a leak in the pipe, the land and the Appalachian Trail would both
be similarly affected. It would have been undeniable that the Trail
and its land are one if the majority had given more weight to the
proven environmental implications of the pipeline. While the
dissent briefly acknowledged the environmental impacts of an
invasive pipeline through the National Park System,302 the
majority’s opinion disregarded the environmental impacts of the
ACP altogether, and consequently the Appalachian Trail’s longterm conservation goals that Congress intended were also
ignored.303
The Cowpasture Court incorrectly reversed and remanded the
Fourth Circuit holding. The Fourth Circuit correctly concluded that
they “trust[ed] the United States Forest Service to ‘speak for the
trees, for the trees have no tongues.’”304 Here the voice of a public
which the System units have been established, except as directly and
specifically provided by Congress.” 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a); (b)(2) (2022).
Amendments to The Park Service’s governing statutes, demonstrated that
Congress has
‘eliminate[d] the distinctions’ between national park units and
mandated that the Park Service ‘treat all units as it had been treating
those parks that had been expressly within the ambit of the Organic Act,
the natural and historic units, with resource protection the overarching
concern. This mandate applies to the of the Organic Act apply with equal
force to the Appalachian Trail as they do to any other national park
unit.).’
Brief for Pamela Underhill et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at
*29, n. 10, Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. 1837 (citing Bicycle Trails Council of Marin
v. Babbitt, 82 F.3d 1445, 1453 (9th Cir. 1996))
299. 16 U.S.C. § 1242(a)(2) (2022).
300. Cowpasture, 911 F.3d at 171-72 (A statement made “in response to the
DEIS’s assertion that in general, as the length of a pipeline route increases, the
environmental impacts also increase.”).
301. Cowpasture, 140 S. Ct. at 1844.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 1841-50.
304. Tezak, supra note 99, at 237 (citing Cowpasture, 911 F.3d 183
(quoting DR. SEUSS, THE LORAX (1971)).
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trail that holds the Eastern Seaboard’s most precious resources305
was ignored in favor of the louder voice: the estimated $5.0 billion
natural gas pipeline construction project.306 While the Court
ultimately sided with the gas industry in deploying a patchwork
analysis to separate the Trail from its land, the project ultimately
was canceled as litigation raged on in other courts.307 Nevertheless,
this decision will long loom as an example of how destructive uses
can manipulate public land and the interpretation of laws
governing that land.

305. A Special Report, supra note 12, at 7.
306. Dominion Energy and Duke Energy Cancel the Atlantic Coast Pipeline,
DOMINION ENERGY (July 5, 2020), www.news.dominionenergy.com/2020-07-05Dominion-Energy-and-Duke-Energy-Cancel-the-Atlantic-Coast-Pipeline
[perma.cc/8S56-K285].
307. Id.

